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SOUTHEAST ASIA REPORT

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TIN PRODUCING COUNTRIES AGREE TO FORM ASSOCIATION

Kuala Lumpur BUSINESS TIMES in English 18 Jun 83 p 1

[Text]

MALAYSIA, Indonesia and Thailand today signed an agreement for the setting up of an Association of Tin Producing Countries (ATPC) which they hope will help stabilise tin prices and promote greater use of the metal.

Primary Industries Minister Datuk Leong Khee Seong, who signed the agreement for Malaysia at the Thai Foreign Ministry here, said that the ATPC had the potential of becoming the most effective producers' association "and we have every intention of ensuring that this potential is fully realised."

The Indonesian Minister of Mines and Energy, Dr Subroto, signed for his country while the Minister of Industry, Mr Ob Vasurat-Na, signed for Thailand.

Under provisions of the agreement, the ATPC

will formally come into existence on Aug. 16, 60 days after today's signing because the three Asean producers alone account for more than the minimum 66 per cent of total production needed to bring the pact into force.

In a joint statement, the three ministers said officials from countries which sign the agreement before Aug. 16 would meet here on Aug. 29 to prepare a budget, draft the necessary rules and regulations and decide on other matters.

The inaugural session of the ATPC conference of ministers would be held soon after the officials complete their work.

Although the agreement is a producers' pact, the ministers said they would take into full account the interests of con-

sumers in working toward their objective of stable and remunerative prices.

The ministers invited all other producer nations to join the ATPC, particularly Bolivia, Nigeria, Australia and Zaire which were represented at the special ministerial meeting of tin producing countries which finalised provisions of the agreement in London in March this year.

Datuk Leong, who described the ATPC as "fully capable of defending producers' interests," said the agreement was coming into force at a time when the tin industry was suffering massive oversupply and continued dumping by the United States.

He said consumption had dropped from some 200,000 tonnes a decade ago to 165,000 tonnes last

BANGKOK, June 17 year and there was an urgent need to step up research and development, particularly the work of the International Tin Research Institute, to widen uses of the metal.

The market overhang had worsened with some 60,000 to 50,000 tonnes in the International Tin Agreement buffer stock, making severe export controls necessary.

Datuk Leong said the ATPC would not set up a parallel buffer stock but would instead pool the support of producer nations to help make the ITA more effective.

He said Malaysia was independently seeking ways to improve the marketing of tin and that a futures contract for the metal might be traded on the Kuala Lumpur Commodities Exchange by the end of this year or in 1984. — Bernama

CSO: 4200/556

ECONOMIC PROGRESS BEING MADE UNDER ERSHAD GOVERNMENT

Kuala Lumpur BUSINESS TIMES in English 11 Jun 83 p 7

[Article by James W. Hatton in Dacca]

[Text]

ONE good thing about martial law is that you can cut through bureaucratic roadblocks and get things done. Lt Gen H.M. Ershad has been quoted as saying.

Lt Gen Ershad, who has been running the martial law regime here, has cut through such roadblocks more than once during the past year.

Sometimes the results have been mixed. But overall, the General's economic policy has drawn praise for moving this impoverished Asian nation, once called the world's "basket case," in the right direction.

The Bangladesh Aid Consortium of industrial countries and world financial institutions expressed confidence in the country's economic progress at its annual meeting in Paris this spring, pledging US\$1.8 billion in aid for Bangladesh for the next fiscal year — US\$350 million more than this year.

Lt Gen Ershad announced a new industrial policy on June 1, 1982, less than three months after he took power in a bloodless coup.

Under the policy, the government handed back to their former owners more than 50 jute and textile mills and auctioned off about 70 smaller companies to the highest bidders. All had been nationalised after independence in 1971.

"Our aim was to promote investment in the country and to allow more free enterprise to operate," said Shaiful Azam, Minister of Industry and Commerce.

"We felt we have to give a greater share to the private sector. They have a reputation for dynamism, expansion, risk taking — better than the public sector."

The Minister said with a smile that there were "many doubting Thomases when we announced the policy," but that the companies had been returned to their former owners in record time.

Criticism

"We announced the policy in June, negotiations began in October and transfers started in late November and were completed by the end of January," Mr Azam said in an interview.

"We were able to cut through the red tape."

The Minister added that it still was too early to tell if the policy will be successful but that "the last few months have been quite promising."

Lt Gen Ershad has launched other cut-through bureaucracy policies — for example, a tough new drug policy to ban 1,700 products said to be dangerous, ineffective or unnecessary — which have run into more vociferous criticism from the manufacturers involved.

But "the economic area is where (Lt Gen Ershad) gets the highest marks," said one Western diplomat here.

Another called it a "cod liver oil year" because Lt Gen Ershad administered doses of unpopular but long overdue reforms that should bring results in the future.

The diplomats spoke on condition, they not be identified by name or nationality.

"There was the disastrous period of nothing happening just before (Lt Gen Ershad) took over," the first diplomat said. "The corruption of the Zia government gave him a good place to start. He put good policies into effect and let the economic side operate by itself."

The diplomat was referring to the late President Ziaur Rahman, who was assassinated in a coup attempt in 1981. Lt Gen Ershad ousted Zia's successor, President Abdus Sattar, in March 1982, charging Mr Sattar had failed to root out corruption in the government.

Lt Gen Ershad "also budgeted in the right way for the first time in history," the diplomat continued. "Before it was a wish list and falsifying the books to cover it. It meant nothing. This year, he took the resources available and budgeted around it."

Another major factor was Lt Gen Ershad's ending of government subsidies for petroleum products, electricity and fertiliser. This also was accomplished quickly — by July 1. It immediately pushed up the artificially low prices of those items by about 40 per cent, but the martial law regime was able to shift blame for the price rises onto previous governments.

Remittances

"It hit the wealthy the hardest and they were not able to speak up," the diplomat said.

"The urban poor were hurt only by the increase in kerosene prices and transportation. At the same time, the price of rice dropped from an all-time high by at least a third."

The sharp rise in petroleum prices also led individuals to use less. And although industrial consumption increased, the country's oil import bill remained about the same.

The diplomat noted that Bangladesh was in a "fairly serious recession," but that it had its good side as far as the government programme was concerned because the depressed demand for imported consumer goods relieved pressure on the nation's desperately short foreign currency reserves.

Bangladesh's balance of payments was further aided by an all-time high in remittances from the labourers it sends to West Asian countries. These payments are expected to hit US\$630 million for the fiscal year that ends June 30, an increase of more than 50 per cent over the previous year, the diplomat said.

And while the increased aid promised by the aid consortium reflects inflation to some extent, it also represents a real boost in resources to help the economy recover, Planning Commission member A.H. Sadatullah told the *Associated Press*.

"Given this, we can import at the US\$2.65 billion level next year," he said. The calculation counts an estimated US\$750 million in export earnings and US\$650 million in wage remittances.

Although Bangladesh's fortunes remain closely linked with nature — the economy is very much at the mercy of floods, droughts, hurricanes and tornadoes — Mr Sadatullah predicted a 6.7 per cent growth in the economy next year.

"The feeling is that if one year is bad, normally it will be good the next year. We had 3.8 per cent growth this year and 0.9 per cent last year. We assume next year the growth will be faster," he said. — AP

CONTACTS WITH OUTSIDE WORLD BEING EXPANDED

Kuala Lumpur BUSINESS TIMES in English 1 Jun 83 p 19

[Article by Bernard Melunsky in Thimpu]

[Text]

THE dragon has taken wings, bringing Bhutan into a new era of international diplomatic activity.

Druk (dragon) Air, the national airline of Bhutan, began operating commercial flights between the Western town of Paro and the Indian city of Calcutta last February.

The thrice-weekly return flight by a 19-seater twin-propeller Dornier aircraft is one of a number of ways in which the remote Himalayan kingdom is expanding contacts with the outside world.

Paro is only about an hour's drive from the capital Thimphu, along a winding mountain road. Access to Thimphu was previously restricted to a lengthy drive from the Indian border in the south.

"With the start of the Druk Air service, we have become accessible. I think it will have a very important psychological effect — one more barrier has been removed," Foreign Minister Dawa Tsering said in an interview.

Bhutan has been slowly emerging since the early 1970s from its self-imposed isolation and Mr Tsering made clear the process would continue at a gradual pace.

Vulnerable

Apart from the opening provided by the airline, Bhutan is feeling its way in the world beyond its forbidding mountain borders through diplomatic channels as well as by sports, cultural and religious contacts.

Known to its own people as Druk Yul (land of the thunder dragon), Bhutan at present has ties only with India, its huge southern neighbour, and Bangladesh.

But Mr Tsering has just arrived back here from Kuwait where Bhutan is likely to establish a consul-general shortly, giving this kingdom its first formal diplomatic relations with any country outside the subcontinent.

Relations with Kuwait are strongly connected with Bhutan's development and trade requirements. Mr Tsering said during his visit he signed an agreement under which Kuwait will provide financial assistance for timber product projects.

Landlocked Bhutan is heavily dependent on India for its overall trade and wants to find additional markets further afield for its exports. Kuwait, and perhaps other Gulf states, may provide some of these.

Bhutan has also appointed honorary consuls in Hong Kong and Singapore, primarily for trade purposes.

But the key to all Bhutan's diplomatic and trade manoeuvres lies in its strategic and vulnerable geographic position wedged between India and the Tibetan region of China.

Even before the emergence of independent India and communist China in the late 1940s, Bhutan had looked south toward an accommodation with the British rulers of India.

Under a 1949 treaty, Bhutan agreed to be guided by the advice of India in its external relations. The treaty also stipulated there would be free trade and commerce between the two countries.

Analysts say the treaty is not seen by Bhutan as a burden, nor by India as a whip to use should its small neighbour get out of line.

Bhutan has displayed its independence in foreign affairs by taking a different stance to India over Kampuchea. India recognises the Vietnamese-backed government in Phnom Penh while Bhutan supports the ousted Democratic Kampuchea government.

There are no formal ties between Thimphu and Peking but Mr Tsering said relations were cordial and he hoped negotiations would begin "in the not-too-distant future" on demarcating the border between Bhutan and Tibet. Problems over the border arose in 1979.

But Bhutan still looks primarily toward India.

"The compulsions of economics, trade and geography make it imperative that we look to the south," said Mr Tsering.

He said the 1949 treaty had never acted as a bar to Bhutan's contacts with the outside world and stressed the rapport and very good relations between Delhi and Thimphu.

India and Bhutan are expected this year to sign a new agreement formalising access for the landlocked kingdom to Bangladesh and Nepal and improved transit to Calcutta port for its exports.

The vast bulk of trade, however, is with India and transacted in Indian rupees. The Bhutanese currency, the ngultrum, is kept at parity with the rupee.

Competition

Mr Tsering said Bhutan was interested in the proposed South Asian forum, a concept first put forward by Bangladesh for regional cooperation among seven countries of the area — Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, the Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka.

He referred to the "unfortunate colonial legacy" of the area. The partition of the subcontinent in 1947 into India and Pakistan, whose eastern half later became Bangladesh, was followed by three wars and lingering suspicion.

"We feel it is high time we turned a new page and learned to live together. There are many areas in which cooperation could be of benefit to all of us," Mr Tsering said.

Foreign ministers of the seven are due to hold their first meeting in Delhi in early August and could give the concept a major political boost.

Mr Tsering, a top sports administrator, highlighted other important areas where Bhutan is slowly extending its international role.

Apart from taking part in some table tennis tournaments and football matches against Indian teams, Bhutan's sportsmen and women have had virtually no international competition.

But this could change dramatically. Mr Tsering is president of a newly-formed Bhutanese Olympic Committee and said his country hoped to become a member of the International Olympic Committee (IOC) and take part in next year's Los Angeles Olympic games.

— Reuter

OUSTER OF HEIR APPARENT A MEASURE OF NE WIN'S POWER

Kuala Lumpur BUSINESS TIMES in English 18 Jun 83 p 7

[Article by Min Thu in Rangoon]

[Text]

BURMESE strongman Ne Win has just shown who's the boss with the "unceremonious exit" from the government in mid-May of his heir apparent, Brig Gen Tin Oo.

"General Ne Win still has the power to make or break leaders in Burma," a senior diplomat said. "He remains the undisputed leader of this country of 36 million people." The diplomat cited as an example the fall from grace of Tin Oo, long considered as the logical successor of, and most powerful man after Ne Win.

Although he relinquished the state presidency in November 1981, Ne Win remains as chairman of the Burma Socialist Programme Party (BSPP) he founded in 1962. The BSPP is the "sole party leading the state" under the Burmese Constitution.

And as such, Ne Win's power and influence have remained undiminished while opting to stay in the background, said the senior diplomat. The Burmese leader observed his 69th birthday at about the same time that Tin Oo's

resignation was announced in the state-run Press last May.

The terse official announcement was published on the back pages of the six dailies. It said Tin Oo had been "permitted to resign" from the 29-man State Council, Burma's highest organ of state power, and the 475-member unicameral People's Congress, the country's legislature.

Simultaneous with Tan Oo's "resignation" was the announcement that the Burmese leadership had also "suspended" Home and Religious Affairs Minister Bo Ni, a known protege of the ousted leader. Both started their career in military intelligence.

This unexpected turn of events created shock waves among the normally placid Burmese citizenry. Since there was no official explanation given, Rangoon was abuzz with speculations as to what really happened.

One such conjecture that went round the diplomatic circuit here was that Bo Ni's suspension arose from his wife's al-

leged involvement with gold smugglers. Still another conjecture was that officials were angered by the "lavish" wedding of one of Bo Ni's children.

In the wake of these conjectures, the Burmese leadership remained secretive as ever. But an indication of Tin Oo's downfall came when Ne Win visited an exhibition of cover designs for books, periodicals and calendars, sponsored by the Information Ministry.

The packing order could be gleaned from the news photos published in the newspapers. They showed Ne Win viewing the exhibits, with President San Yu trailing behind. Also included in the photos were BSPP secretary Aye Ko, Premier Maung Maung Kha and Deputy Premier and Defence Minister Kyaw Htin. Tin Oo, who should have normally been with the group, was conspicuously absent.

Tin Oo's rise and subsequent fall were just as dramatic. The 55-year-old General joined the Burmese army as a soldier in 1942 and later studied economics at the

Rangoon University from 1946 to 1949. He joined the army in 1950 as an intelligence officer.

He rose in the intelligence services, becoming a colonel and Director of Defence Services Intelligence in 1972. In 1974, he was elected Congressman when Burma returned to constitutional rule.

When the National Intelligence Bureau was established, Tin Oo became its first director. His elevation coincided with his assignment as military assistant to then President Ne Win with whom he developed a close association.

Colleagues have described Tin Oo as "able, industrious, sincere and efficient." His close association with Ne Win catapulted him to power, culminating in his election as member of the State Council in November 1981.

On the other hand, many attribute Bo Ni's rise to power to his close association with Tin Oo. As one astute Burmese observed, "Bo Ni almost practically rode on Tin Oo's coat-tails."

INCREASE IN PRODUCTION, EXPORT OF RICE

Kuala Lumpur BUSINESS TIMES in English 25 Jun 83 p 19

[Article by Min Thu in Rangoon]

[Text]

BUOYED up by increasing production, Burma aims to export 900,000 tons of rice — the country's biggest foreign exchange earner — this year.

The export is to be made from 1983's rice harvest which totalled an estimated 14.5 million tons. The output represented a big jump from the set plan target of 13.2 million tons.

Trade Minister Khin Maung Yi did not mention the prospective buyers in his talk before the state-run Agriculture and Farm Producers Corporation which handles crop exports.

But it was understood that as before, the biggest buyers of Burmese rice would come from Asia, including Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore. Many Asian countries suffered production slumps because of natural causes like drought.

For the past years, Rangoon has been trying to increase rice production, not only for export but also for domestic use. In 1982, Burmese farmers planted padi on 12.03 million acres. This year, rice planting is expected to expand to 12.37 million acres.

Along with expanding acreage, the government

is also encouraging increased use of agricultural inputs like irrigation, adoption of new and scientific farming methods, changing crop patterns and the introduction of eight new kinds of special high-yield rice strains in 82 to townships.

Per-acre production of the high-yield strains has particularly been pleasing to planners. These varieties average 70.8 46-pound baskets per acre against the 57.06 baskets per acre for traditional strains. (The country estimates rice output in terms of 46-pound baskets per acre).

High-yield strains have already been planted to 53.4 per cent of Burma's total rice acreage. They accounted for about 82.2 per cent of the country's total padi production.

Traditionally, Burma has always been one of Asia's biggest rice exporters. But increasing population and dwindling production have adversely affected its rice sales abroad. Till the early 1960s, the country exported an average of 1.5 million tons of rice a year.

The 1970s, however, saw export sales plunge below the one-million-ton mark. In 1974-75, rice exports totalled only 165,000

tons; 1975-76, 331,000 tons; 1976-77, 537,000 tons; 1977-78, 563,000 tons; 1978-79, 158,000 tons; 1979-80, 724,000 tons; 1980-81, 821,000 tons; and 1981-82, 867,000 tons.

Rice smuggling was also rampant, particularly in the mid-1980s when Asia was reeling from an acute rice shortage. Since rice is also a hot political issue, Burma has since then made sure that it only exported surplus production.

And for reason. Rice shortage and distribution bottlenecks led to the riots in the Arakan state capital Akyab in 1985. To prevent their recurrence, the government now keeps an annual buffer stock of more than 200,000 tons for emergencies.

The government likewise implemented "effective padi purchasing plans." Farmers are allowed to keep stocks for their own consumption and for seeds. They are required to sell the rest to the state or authorised agencies.

From this plan, Burma gets about a third of total rice production annually. Farmers should sell the stipulated rice quotas to the government as fixed by local authorities at the end of the harvest.

If they fail, the govern-

ment could revoke the working rights granted to them. However, the strict rule has been relaxed somewhat for farmers who could not sell the fixed quotas because of low production caused by natural calamities like bad weather.

For its part, the government has been encouraging farmers to go full-blast into the production of export crops like rice. For instance, Rangoon granted loans totalling US\$80 million to rice farmers last year.

At the same time, the government promised to continue distributing quality seeds and imported fertiliser at subsidised prices to farmers. It also introduced a special insurance scheme for the peasants as well as extend cattle purchasing loans which in 1982, reached US\$3 million.

With these incentives, Burma hopes to spur farmers to greater production heights. According to official figures, there are now 0.2 million heads of peasant families working on 26.2 million acres of land. Sixty-one per cent of the total farm under five acres which constitute about 25 per cent of the total cultivable acreage — Depth-News Asia

OIL AND GAS EXPLORATION; COAL RESERVES

Kuala Lumpur BUSINESS TIMES in English 25 Jun 83 p 1

[Text]

JAKARTA, June 24
THIRTY-four foreign oil companies last year spent more than US\$4 billion (M\$9.2 billion) for oil and gas exploration in Indonesia, the director general of Pertamina Oil and Natural Gas, Mr Wijarso, said here today.

He told newsmen after the closing of the four-day Indo Energy 1983 Conference that the 34 companies were now operating in 76 contract areas for Pertamina.

He added that a majority of the companies were American and Japanese which set up joint ventures with few local companies.

The companies had explored and identified 50 oil basins so far, he said.

He added that Pertamina on its own could not explore and develop all the basins and other hydrocarbon resources because of the huge capital involved.

Meanwhile, the Indone-

sian Director General of Mines, Professor John A. Katili, said that Indonesia has about one billion tonnes of coal reserves.

He added that 300 million tonnes of coal reserves are in west and central Sumatra, 250 million tonnes in south Sumatra, 150 million tonnes in north-east Kalimantan, 150 million tonnes in east Kalimantan and 150 million tonnes in south Kalimantan.

Prof. Katili said that coal mines development needed big capital and because Indonesia was still facing a shortage of experienced coal mine engineers, the government has now invited foreign investors to tap the country's huge coal reserves.

He added that the foreign companies that had concluded production sharing contracts on coal with Indonesia were Spanish, Italian, Japanese, American and South Korean firms. — Bernama

GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT UP 2.5 PERCENT IN 1982

Kuala Lumpur BUSINESS TIMES in English 8 Jun 83 p 1

[Text]

JAKARTA, June 7
INDONESIA's gross national product increased a modest 2.5 per cent in 1982, reflecting a sharp slowdown of the economy due to the world recession and oil glut, two economic reports said today.

The International Monetary Fund and the World Bank reports said Indonesia's GNP amounted to US\$18.67 billion in 1982, a 2.5 per cent rise over the US\$18.20 billion in 1981 but considerably less compared with the 7-8 per cent increases in the three previous years.

The steady climb of oil prices in the 1979-1981 period brought a high 7-8 per cent increase in the country's GNP, but the growth — one of the world's most spectacular — quickly slowed down as oil prices dropped due to the glut on the world oil market in 1982, the reports said.

The manufacturing sector, a growth leader in

previous years, was drastically affected by the world recession, growing by only 0.7 per cent in 1982 compared with 1981, from US\$2.9 billion to US\$2.92 billion, the reports said.

The IMF and World Bank reports will be submitted later this month to the members of the Inter-Governmental Group on Indonesia, a club of 17 industrialised nations committed to help Indonesia's development.

World Bank Deputy Director Attila Karaosmanoglu, who met with President Suharto today, said the IGGI will increase its aid to Indonesia this year to help the developing country cope with its economic problems.

Mr Karaosmanoglu, who arrived on Sunday for a five-day visit, gave no specific figure but Press reports said the IGGI was expected to allocate some US\$2.8 billion in aid to Indonesia this year. — UPI

JAKARTA OBLIGED TO INCREASE PRIVATE BORROWING

Kuala Lumpur BUSINESS TIMES in English 2 Jun 83 p 20

[Editorial: Jakarta: Bit Between Teeth]

[Text]

INDONESIA is in a bind. Growth is essential to containing rising unemployment and to alleviating widespread poverty. But a World Bank report says that its ailing economy is not likely to recover before 1985. Because of its burgeoning current account deficit — which hit US\$4.3 billion (M\$16 billion) in fiscal 1982/1983 ending last March — it has been forced to trim government spending sharply. This adds to the adverse impact of lower export earnings. While austerity measures may place its finances on a better footing, the cure prescribed may prove to be worse than the disease for the average Indonesian. For example, the budget for the 1983-1984 fiscal year, presented last January, cut food and fuel subsidies drastically while civil service salaries were frozen. In April, the rupiah was devalued by 27.5 per cent and in May government spending was further slashed. Projects designed to conserve nearly US\$20 billion in foreign exchange have been rescheduled. In spite of these measures, the World Bank report says it will still be necessary to borrow an additional US\$16 billion from overseas over the next three years to ensure a resumption of growth by 1984-85. Since the benefits from new investments to diversify the economy will take time, average growth for the next two years may be no more than 3.2 per cent — less than half of the average for recent years.

Jakarta's Herculean efforts and faithful adherence to policies laid down by the World Bank will by no means guarantee a recovery since this depends to a substantial extent on factors outside its control. Another resurgence of world-wide recession could throw Indonesia back to square one. This might lead to a further drop in demand for oil and hence its price; it would also dampen demand for non-oil com-

modity exports. Manufacturing has been singled out by the report as providing the "key" to a significant expansion of non-oil exports, but its expansion is only possible if there is increased access to industrial markets. Increased protectionism may, however, throw this strategy out of line. Likewise, another upsurge in interest rates could make the debt burden even more onerous. Although the amount owed to private creditors accounts for only 42 per cent of total debt outstanding, including the undisbursed portion, debt service payments on the private portion is almost double that due to official creditors because of the interest rate differential.

Regardless of the efficacy of World Bank recommendations, Indonesian policy makers have no choice but to toe the line, mainly because Jakarta relies heavily on concessional aid masterminded by the bank. It is certainly being helpful: it has recommended that the Inter-Governmental Group on Indonesia (IGGI) maintain aid at least at the US\$2 billion level of last year and provide some additional "quick-disbursing commodity aid." But the needs are so large that Indonesia has no choice but to step up private borrowing. For this, a seal of approval from the World Bank should be helpful in obtaining funds on better terms than might otherwise be offered. This is because some banks, fearful of their exposure to less developed countries, are cutting back on their loan commitments. However, Indonesia's credit rating is still pretty good. With a little help from the bank and other friends, it will not be difficult to mobilise the loans it needs. The problem, however, is that the greater the debt, the less room there will be for manoeuvre in the future.

CSO: 4200/560

MYSTERIOUS MURDERS OF HABITUAL CRIMINALS

Legal System at Stake

Kuala Lumpur NEW STRAITS TIMES in English 20 Jun 83 p 15

[Text]

JAKARTA, Sun. — Will the killing of ex-convicts and habitual criminals in Jogjakarta and Jakarta by mysterious squad killers reduce the crime rate in Indonesia?

The question was asked by Abdul Rahman Salleh, head of the Indonesian Human Rights and Legal Aid Bureau here.

Since March this year, 108 ex-convicts, extortionists, blackmailers and gang leaders in the two cities have been shot to death in cold blood by mysterious killers.

Many of those killed were between 19 and 40 years old, and had tattoo marks — of scorpions, dragons, skull and cross bones and eagles — on their bodies, indicating their respective gangs.

Many critics have disagreed with the statement by the commander of the Indonesian Armed Forces, Gen. Tan Sri Benny Murdani, that the killings were due to gang clashes.

However, the commander of the Jakarta military garrison, Maj. Gen. Try Sutrisno recently told the local Press that his garrison was not responsible for the mysterious killings.

He said no order to shoot on sight had been issued to his garrison.

Abdul Rahman, a prominent and experienced lawyer and staunch advocate of human rights, said such killings should be stopped because they would not stop crimes in the country.

He added that such cold-blooded killing had never occurred elsewhere, and

that it had put the Indonesian legal system and practice at stake.

Many human rights advocates believe that the authorities had sponsored the mysterious killer squads to eliminate potential gang leaders and ex-convicts who had resorted to underworld activities.

The police have records on the background of the victims but have not issued any statement on the killings so far.

A police spokesman said the crime rate in all Indonesian cities had been drastically reduced and contained in the last four months.

Not many robberies, rapes and extortions had been lodged, he added.

Remove

He said many youngsters with no underworld

link had sought police help to remove their tattoos for fear of falling victim to the mysterious killer squads.

It is understood that sociology and criminology students at a local university will soon study the impact and results of the killings.

The sources pointed out that the modus operandi of the mysterious killer squads against the underworld in Indonesia was unique, but alarming.

Jakarta, with nearly nine million people, must be free from crime to woo more tourists following the two-month visa free facilities, said the Director-General of the Tourism Department, Joop Ave.

An anti-crime operation, he felt, would help "clean" the city in the interest of public safety. — Bernama

Lack of Official Reaction

Kuala Lumpur NEW STRAITS TIMES in English 19 Jun 83 p 14

[Text]

JAKARTA, Sat. — Indonesia's mystery killers have murdered nine more men in western Java during the past week, all of whom had tattoos on their bodies, newspapers here reported yesterday.

The victims appeared to be the latest in a series of shadowy killings of criminal suspects which according to one human rights organisation, the Jakarta Legal Aid Institute, may already total 400 this year.

Police confirmed five of this week's reported murders.

They said three men with tattoos were found

shot at close range on Thursday in Krawang City, about 50km (30 miles) east of Jakarta. Two more were found clubbed to death on a rubber plantation in Sukabumi, some 80km (50 miles) south of the capital.

Press reports said three heavily tattooed men were found shot dead in Jakarta last Sunday and an unidentified man was discovered in a rice sack on a river bank in the town of Depok on Thursday with a bullet in the back of his head.

The authorities say they have not yet identified any of the killers.

But some officials

have hinted they might be Government agents, and Attorney General Ismail Saleh described them in Parliament earlier this month as "guardian angels," saying innocent people were relieved at the disappearance of the suspects.

Mr Abdul Rahman Saleh, a director of the Legal Aid Institute, said it was suspected that the killings were officially condoned.

"There has been a strong suspicion among the people that the killings followed the pattern of similar operations in Jogjakarta (East Java) which were conducted by

the garrison command," he said in a telephone interview.

"If not done by official quarters, how do you explain the lack of reaction from official (law enforcing) agencies?"

The murders have struck fear into the hearts of young Indonesians with indelible tattoos, whether guilty or innocent of crimes. Many have sought protection from local police stations. Some have even used acid to try to remove the marks.

The Indonesian Press has described many of the victims as bandits and ex-convicts. — Reuter.

CSO: 4200/560

DONATIONS OF WESTERN AID MAY BE TERMINATED

Kuala Lumpur BUSINESS TIMES in English 22 Jun 83 p 17

[Article by Richard Cowper, recently in Kampuchea]

[Text]

AT FIRST glance, rural and urban Kampuchea appears to have made a remarkable recovery from the dislocation of Pol Pot's three-and-a-half-year reign of terror, which at one point seemed to threaten the very survival of the Khmer race.

Phnom Penh's population, reduced to a few hundred by the forced expulsion of about 3 million people in 1978, is now back to its normal pre-war level of about 800,000. In the countryside new, albeit meagre, thatched huts have sprung up, while the area planted to paddy rice has expanded dramatically.

Western aid donors have for some time been arguing that the emergency in Kampuchea is over and most are refusing to make any more donations. But beneath the apparent surface improvement, it is clear that Kampuchea is still in a desperate state.

There is still widespread malnutrition, grinding poverty and a lack of even the most rudimentary health and sanitation facilities. Almost four years after Vietnamese troops rolled into Phnom Penh, Kampuchea's social and economic infrastructure re-

mains shattered and the country has yet to recover from the decade of war before the invasion.

In the once beautiful city of Phnom Penh people wash their food and clothes in open sewers, pigs and poultry stare out from formerly elegant French balconies and rubbish piles up along avenues once noted for their charming but long-gone red flame trees.

At least 25,000 of the city's inhabitants live in squalid poverty, unable to obtain even the barest minimum of food. Half the city's deaths are said to be caused by malnutrition, lack of sanitation and disease.

In the countryside the system remains fragile and unstable. Little progress seems to have been made on the reconstruction of irrigation works to combat the vagaries of the monsoon. At least 300,000 children are suffering from severe to moderate malnutrition which health experts say threatens to lead to widespread mental retardation.

Western aid workers agree that the emergency of 1979 and 1980 is over. One said: "The country is no longer full of walking skeletons." But as the latest United

Nations Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) report on Kampuchea says: "The damage done from 1970 to 1979 was so ghastly that only imaginative, sustained humanitarian aid covering a wide field of development and over a long period of time, can restore a semblance and normal economic life."

Such pleas seem unlikely to be heeded by the West however, which for political reasons now seems intent on closing down the emergency programme to Kampuchea.

An hour's flight from Phnom Penh in the luxury 15-storey UN building in Bangkok, a stony-faced diplomat, Mr Edward Van Roy, head of the development planning division at the Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (Escap), said in response to inquiries about Kampuchea's economy and the need for continued aid: "As far as I am concerned Cambodia just does not exist, so you see there's really nothing for me to discuss."

He is both right and wrong. The current Hanot-backed Heng Samrin regime in Kampuchea does not have a seat at the UN and is not recognised by the majority of the world community,

which has condemned Vietnam's occupation of the country and called for the withdrawal of troops and internationally supervised general elections. Vietnam has shown little sign of releasing its iron grip on Kampuchea.

The West has backed the shaky tripartite coalition led by former Kampuchean Head of State Prince Norodom Sihanouk. This coalition, which includes senior members of Pol Pot's notorious Khmer Rouge regime, controls about 300,000 people near the Thai border and has a guerilla army now believed to number around 30,000.

Whatever the political realities, the Kampuchean people do exist, and as the country continues to be a battleground for big power rivalry and the self-interest of its neighbours, the inhabitants face the prospect of their vital needs being ignored by both East and West.

Vietnam, itself one of the poorest nations in the world and already drained by the high cost of maintaining its army in Kampuchea, seems incapable of providing the funds and expertise necessary.

The Soviet Union, which claims to have pumped US\$400 million into the country since 1978, appears to have done little other than provide fuel and a few trucks and to refurbish the strategically important port of Kompong Som.

Since 1979 the UN has provided around US\$350 million in emergency humanitarian aid to Kampuchea's estimated 7 million people, roughly the same amount as it provided during the same period to the 300,000 Kampuchean living along the border.

Under normal circumstances UN institutions like the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank would step in after the emergency programme had dealt with the initial disaster. But because Kampuchea is not recognised by the UN and because many are bent on punishing Vietnam, Kampuchea now faces the grim prospect of an imminent severance of a vital international lifeline.

Aid workers say that a massive shortage of draught animals and a serious shortage of manpower (women account for around 85 per cent of the country's population) mean that even if there is a good monsoon this year, Kampuchea will still run short of about 130,000 tons of rice at the

rock bottom subsistence level of 12 kg. per capita per month.

A moderately poor monsoon could easily push this shortfall to over 300,000 tonnes — more than 30 per cent of Kampuchea's estimated 900,000-tonne milled rice crop of 1982. Some of the poorest provinces produced a mere 5 kg of rice per capita per month last year, less than 50 per cent of the required minimum.

For 1983, emergency food aid of 32,000 tonnes of rice from Western donors will be necessary to supplement local efforts, aid workers say. Special feeding programmes of protein and vitamin rich food for malnourished children need to be started immediately.

So far this year, Western donors have pledged around US\$45 million in aid to the refugees along the Thai border but only Sweden (which has pledged US\$1.6 million) has agreed to provide any aid to Kampuchea itself.

Vietnam, the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe should now take over and the UN emergency programme should be closed down, the donors argue. For the West it seems, for the moment at least, there's really nothing to discuss.

— FT

HENG SAMRIN GREET'S MOZAMBIQUE'S MACHEL

BK270640 Phnom Penh SPK in French 0429 GMT 27 Jun 83

[Text] Phnom Penh, 27 Jun (SPK)--On the occasion of the national independence day of the People's Republic of Mozambique, Heng Samrin, general secretary of the KPRP Central Committee and chairman of the PRK Council of State, has sent his warmest congratulations to Samora Moises Machel, president of the Frelimo Party and president of the People's Republic of Mozambique.

The message said: We infinitely rejoice over your brilliant victories achieved by the heroic Mozambique people under the leadership of the Frelimo Party with you as leader in the tireless and tenacious struggle which defeated all perfidious maneuvers of sabotage and subversion of imperialists and their South African lackeys to defend the revolutionary gains and the territorial integrity of the country, and actively contribute to the common struggle for progress, peace, and international security.

We sincerely thank the people and Government of Mozambique for their support for the Kampuchean revolutionary cause and the good will of the three Indo-chinese countries which are aimed at building Southeast Asia into a zone of peace, stability, and cooperation. We assure you the KPRP, the government and people of Kampuchea will always be united with the Frelimo Party, the government, and the fraternal people of Mozambique in the uncompromising struggle against all continual acts of sabotage perpetrated by the South African racist regime backed by U.S. imperialism and its allies.

We present you our best wishes for your personal happiness, and the well-being, and prosperity of the Mozambique people.

On the same occasion, Hun Sen, foreign minister of Kampuchea, sent his congratulations to his Mozambique counterpart Joaquim Alberto Chissano.

CSO: 4219/65

DK CADRES KILLED BY KHMER SEREI IN TRADE RACKET

Bangkok DAO SIAM in Thai 12 Jun 83 pp 1, 2

[Article: "Khmer Trade Double-Cross; Trader and One Other Killed"]

[Text] The deputy head of a Khmer Serei unit and his followers attacked and shot the head of the Khmer Rouge Economic Unit and his subordinate with AK rifles at the Surin provincial refugee center. They riddled their bodies with bullets. This stemmed from a dispute over profits from smuggling water buffalo. Police gave chase but they fled across the border.

A DAO SIAM reporter stationed in Surin Province reported that at 0200 hours on 11 June, Police Lieutenant Colonel Sanit Thatsiri, the inspector at the Kap Choeng District police station in Surin Province, was informed that Kampuchean refugees had been shot and killed at the Kampuchean refugee center at Chong Tha Mo Duan in Bat Tai Commune, Kap Choeng District, Surin Province. Thus, together with the district public health official, he hurried there and found the bodies of two Kampuchean refugees, whose bodies and heads had been riddled with bullets from AK rifles. They were later identified as Lieutenant Wongchanthaphan, the head of the economic unit of the Khmer Rouge, and Mr Uan (surname unknown), the deputy head. Twelve AK casings were found at the scene.

From the investigation, it was learned that Lieutenant Wongchan and Mr Mong, or Sangchuon, who was the deputy head of the Khmer Serei unit, had made contact to purchase water buffalo in Kampuchea and sell them in Thailand. Mr Mong was the person who was to purchase the water buffalo in Kampuchea and then send them to Lieutenant Wongchan, who was to sell them. But after Lieutenant Wongchan sold them, he refused to send the money to Mr Mong. This made Mr Mong angry and so he took five members of his group and barbarically shot and killed Lieutenant Wongchan and Mr Uan, his subordinate, in the center. They then fled across the border into Kampuchea.

As for the background of Lieutenant Wongchan, he is a Pathan Muslim who formerly lived in Ka Sang district in Buriram Province. His wife is a meat seller at the open-air market in Prasat District in Surin Province. Before he was made a lieutenant in the Khmer Serei [sic] Army, he left Thailand and went to Kampuchea and volunteered to serve as a soldier there during the time when Field Marshal Lon Nol was the president of Kampuchea. He was promoted and given this position. At present, the police are conducting an intense search for Mr Mong, or Sangchuon, and his men. But it appears that all of them have fled into Kampuchea.

11943

CSO: 4207/127

VODK ON SOLDIERS' STRUGGLE AGAINST SRV FORCES

BK231025 (Clandestine) Voice of Democratic Kampuchea in Cambodian 2330 GMT
22 Jun 83

[Station commentary: "Khmers Do not Fight Fellow Khmers; Khmers Unite To Fight the Vietnamese Aggressors"]

[Text] During the Kampuchean people's war of national liberation against the war of aggression and genocide staged by the Le Duan Vietnamese enemy aggressors, our Democratic Kampuchean Government issued the political program of the Patriotic and Democratic Front of the Great National Union of Kampuchea [PDFGNUM] to rally all Kampuchean people's forces in the struggle against the Vietnamese enemy aggressors for the defense and survival of our Kampuchean nation, people and race. Our Democratic Kampuchean Government adopted a sacred political slogan "Khmers do not serve the Vietnamese to kill the Khmer nation. Khmers do not fight fellow Khmers; Khmers unite to fight the Vietnamese aggressors." This slogan was put forward to rally all of our Kampuchean nation's forces and the entire Khmer people--especially Khmer soldiers, militiamen and civil servants, forced by the Vietnamese enemy to serve their way of aggression--to wage a struggle against the Le Duan Vietnamese enemy aggressors.

Our Democratic Kampuchean Government propagated the political program of the PDFGNUM and this sacred political slogan throughout the country. Our government has always tried to wholeheartedly and correctly implement this political program and slogan. All nationalities and strata of our Kampuchean people actively assist and support our Democratic Kampuchean Government, national army and guerrillas. Our people are struggling with all their means against the Vietnamese enemy aggressors everywhere. Khmer soldiers, militiamen and civil servants, who now better understand our Democratic Kampuchean political program and slogan, and who have had direct experiences with the Vietnamese enemy aggressors and race exterminators during the past more than 4 years, have staged an ardent and determined struggle against the Vietnamese enemy aggressors in a spirit of national and personal hatred. They have waged a struggle with all their means in their capacity as Khmers. They have fought against the Vietnamese enemy aggressors, expansionists and race exterminators for the defense of their nation, people and race. This struggle has been waged with the aim of preserving Kampuchean territory and the nation, and to stop the Vietnamese from swallowing it as they did Kampuchea Kraom [former Cambodian territory in Southern part of Vietnam]. Khmer soldiers,

militiamen and civil servants refuse to cooperate with the Vietnamese enemy aggressors in killing fellow Khmers, nor do they kill their own people as ordered by the Vietnamese. They have deserted the Vietnamese enemy aggressors and returned to their villages. They have mutinied and fired on the Vietnamese enemy aggressors, and joined our national army and guerrillas of Democratic Kampuchea. They have cooperated with our national army and guerrillas of Democratic Kampuchea and our Kampuchean people in the struggle to drive the Vietnamese enemy aggressors out of Kampuchea.

The struggle movement among Khmer soldiers, militiamen and civil servants against the Vietnamese enemy aggressors is ardent and has been waged all over the country. Recently, 400 Khmer soldiers, forced by the Vietnamese enemy aggressors to undergo military training at (Anlung Chrey), Kompong Speu Province, deserted and returned to their villages. On 3, 4 and 5 June, 87 Khmer soldiers, forced by the Vietnamese enemy to fight and die in Puok District, Siem Reap Province, deserted and joined our Democratic Kampuchean National Army and guerrillas. These defectors brought 42 guns with them. In other areas, there are desertions and mutinies by Khmer soldiers, militiamen and civil servants. They cooperate with the Kampuchean nation and people, and the national army and guerrillas of Democratic Kampuchea in the struggle against the Vietnamese enemies with a burning hatred. Although the Le Duan Vietnamese enemy aggressors have used fascist methods to barbarously suppress, arrest, imprison and massacre our people, they cannot break the patriotic spirit of Khmer soldiers, militiamen, and civil servants or that of the entire Kampuchean people.

During the past 4 years Khmer soldiers, militiamen and civil servants have had direct experience of the Vietnamese enemy aggressors, who treated them like animals. The Vietnamese aggressors have arrested and killed Khmer soldiers, militiamen and civil servants as they wish. The Vietnamese enemy aggressors have robbed, raped, arrested and killed the families of Khmer soldiers, militiamen and civil servants. Khmer soldiers, militiamen and civil servants have seen with their own eyes the danger caused by the Vietnamese aggression which would eliminate the Kampuchean nation and race as the Vietnamese did to Kampuchea Kraom.

Therefore, the Vietnamese enemy aggressors have not succeeded in their efforts to dupe the Kampuchean people, Khmer soldiers, militiamen and civil servants. Through their daily acts in killing and massacring the Kampuchean people and causing the most tragic suffering to the Kampuchean nation and people during the past more than 4 years, the Le Duan Vietnamese enemy aggressors have shown their ugly faces as the most barbarous enemies of the Kampuchean nation and people.

Khmers do not serve the Vietnamese policy of aggression by killing fellow Khmers. Khmers unite with each other to fight the Vietnamese aggressors for the defense and survival of Kampuchean nation, people and race. Khmers unite to fight the Vietnamese enemy aggressors until they are all driven out of Kampuchean territory. This is a national and sacred duty, and a patriotic ideal of all Kampucheans.

The Le Duan Vietnamese enemy aggressors are bogged down, and are sliding toward complete defeat. The tough struggle waged by our national army and guerrillas of Democratic Kampuchea, and our Kampuchean people during the past 4 and a half years clearly shows that the Le Duan Vietnamese enemy aggressors cannot extricate themselves from the impasse, and they will definitely be defeated.

Therefore, brother and sister Khmer soldiers, militiamen and civil servants: revolt and stage more struggles against the Vietnamese enemy aggressors. Turn your guns on the Vietnamese enemy aggressors and race exterminators, and fire on them in order to cooperate with our national army and guerrillas of Democratic Kampuchea in the fight against the Vietnamese enemy aggressors until they are all driven out of Kampuchea. This struggle will contribute to the liberation of our Kampuchean nation, people and race from the Le Duan Vietnamese enemy aggressors in conformity with the call of our Kampuchean nation which has a glorious history of struggle over the past more than 2,000 years.

CSO: 4212/44

AGRICULTURAL REPORT 20-26 JUNE 1983

[Editorial report] [BK271050] Kampuchean media have reported the following agricultural developments during the reporting period 20-26 June:

National level: According to a report carried by Phnom Penh SPK in French at 0400 GMT on 21 June, with the help of 449 tractors provided by the Agriculture Ministry, peasants in 14 provinces have so far tilled 52,350 hectares of land, or 30 percent of the plan. The Agriculture Ministry has also given these provinces 2,686 metric tons of chemical fertilizers, and last year it provided them with 36,817 metric tons of chemical fertilizers, 5,260 metric tons of seeds, 137 metric tons of insecticides, 80,500 gunnysack, 4,345 hoes, 33,075 plowshares, and 15,973 mold-boards, the report adds.

Svay Rieng Province: At 0430 GMT on 21 June, Phnom Penh Domestic Service in Cambodian reported that in Romeas Hek District, since the beginning of the season, almost 50 hectares of land have been tilled, over 40 hectares of various types of rice sown, and 120 hectares of rice, 130 hectares of cassava, and 10 hectares of corn have been planted. The report adds that 8,500 pigs, 5,340 ducks, and more than 36,500 chicken have been raised.

Kompong Cham Province: SPK reported at 0451 GMT on 21 June that in Prey Chhor District, so far, 808 hectares of land have been reclaimed for cultivation; and during the first week of this month alone, peasants in the district cleared 120 hectares of land for rice cultivation and planted 400 hectares of rice and subsidiary crops. The report says there are 20,587 draft animals in the district and peasants have prepared 81,000 metric tons of fertilizers and 148 metric tons of seeds for cultivation. The report also adds that last dry season, after the harvest of 18,354 hectares of land, peasants sold 850 metric tons of paddy to the state. In another report carried by SPK at 0437 GMT on 23 June, so far, peasants in Thbong Khmum District have reclaimed more than 1,000 hectares of land and planted 3,450 hectares of rice and subsidiary crops; they also have at their disposal 50 metric tons of chemical fertilizers, 1,300 metric tons of rice seeds, 20 motor pumps, and a sufficient number of agricultural implements. The report says there are more than 30,000 cattle and 19,150 pigs in the district. This year, Thbong Khmum District intends to grow 18,870 hectares of rice--roughly the same as last year--the report concludes.

Siem Reap-Oddar Meanchey Province: According to Phnom Penh Domestic Service at 0430 GMT on 23 June, by the middle of the month, peasants in Kralanh District had tilled more than 2,000 hectares of land and planted over 2,000 hectares of broadcast and slash-and-burn rice and 50 hectares of subsidiary crops.

Kandal Province: Phnom Penh Domestic Service at 0430 GMT on 22 June reported that by early June, over 3,400 hectares of land had been tilled, 75 hectares of floating rice broadcast, 122 hectares of rice sown, over 1,700 hectares of land reclaimed, and more than 1,600 hectares of subsidiary crops planted. The report also says that last dry season, the province planted almost 33,000 hectares of dry season rice and adds that, so far, over 22,000 hectares have been harvested, with an average yield of more than 2 metric tons per hectare. More than 4,800 metric tons of paddy were sold to the state, the report concludes. The radio at 0430 GMT on 24 June said, so far, peasants in Phnom Penh District have tilled almost 600 hectares of land and sown 230 hectares of rice.

According to a report carried by SPK in French at 1443 GMT on 24 June, by the middle of the month, over 5,000 hectares of rice had been transplanted in the province and 9,450 hectares of subsidiary crops had been planted in Kaoh Thom and S'ang districts. The report adds that during the first 6 months, 49,000 cattle were vaccinated against epizootic diseases and 2,500 metric tons of chemical fertilizers and 2,300 liters of insecticides were prepared for this rice season. A report carried by SPK at 0411 GMT on 25 June, notes that Ponhea Loe District has so far tilled 210 hectares of land and sown 140 hectares, despite a lack of rain. The report adds that the provincial agricultural service has provided the district with 23 metric tons of rice seeds, 400 metric tons of chemical fertilizers, 2,000 liters of fuel, and 4 motor pumps. Last dry season, Ponhea Loe District planted 3,290 hectares of rice with an average yield of more than 2 metric tons per hectare, the report says. It adds that more than 290 hectares of subsidiary crops were also planted and over 290 metric tons of paddy sold to the state. At 1100 GMT on 26 June, Phnom Penh Domestic Service reported that in Lvea Em District, 160 hectares of rice, 114 hectares of subsidiary crops, and more than 25 hectares of industrial crops have been planted so far, and 3,050 head of cattle vaccinated.

Kompong Thom Province: According to SPK at 0412 GMT on 24 June, peasants in Baray District have so far sown 300 hectares out of the 310 hectares tilled and planted more than 500 hectares of slash-and-burn rice and almost 1,000 hectares of subsidiary crops. In a statement carried by the radio at 1100 GMT on 24 June, the vice chairman of Stoung District Agricultural Service said this year this district plans to grow 28,100 hectares of rainy season rice and 7,000 hectares of floating rice. So far, 867 hectares of land have been tilled and 1,121 hectares done with the help of tractors, and 13 hectares of IR-36B rice planted, he added. In Baray District, the radio at 1300 GMT on 25 June said by the beginning of the month, over 300 hectares of rice had been sown, 463 hectares broadcast, more than 50 hectares of late and slash-and-burn rice transplanted, and 230 hectares of corn, over 550 hectares of beans, 30 hectares of potato, and 176 hectares of vegetables planted. There are more than 36,000 head of cattle in the district, the report says.

Takeo Province: On 24 June at 0430 GMT, the radio reported that peasants in Prey Kabbas District have broadcast 1,650 hectares of floating rice so far and planted more than 460 hectares corn and other subsidiary crops. In another report at 1100 GMT on 26 June, the radio said Bati District reaped over 1,900 metric tons of paddy from its fields last dry season.

Komiong Chhnang Province: At 0430 GMT on 24 June, the radio reported that the province plans to grow 6,100 hectares of floating rice and 48,000 hectares of rainy season rice this year. It adds that by mid-June, almost 4,000 hectares of land had been tilled, over 2,800 hectares of floating rice broadcast, over 280 hectares of various kinds of rice sown, 210 hectares of slash-and-burn rice planted, over 300 hectares of highland rice broadcast, and more than 670 hectares of subsidiary crops and 81 hectares of industrial crops planted. The report concludes by noting that almost 1,500 hectares of land have so far been reclaimed out of the planned 12,000 hectares.

Prey Veng Province: SPK at 0416 GMT on 26 June reported that by mid-June, peasants in Baphnum District had tilled about 1,000 hectares of land and planted some 100 hectares of floating rice. The report also says that the district has at its disposal 6 metric tons of chemical fertilizers, 1,200 metric tons of rice seeds, and a great quantity of natural fertilizer. Last dry season, peasants in the district planted almost 2,000 hectares of rice with a relatively high yield, the report concludes.

Pursat Province: At 0430 GMT on 25 June, the radio reported that the province's veterinary service had vaccinated more than 160 head of cattle in June.

Battambang Province: According to a report broadcast by the radio at 1300 GMT on 26 June, since the beginning of this rainy season, peasants in Sangke District have tilled more than 8,700 hectares of land, broadcast over 2,000 hectares of rice, and sown another 12 hectares.

CSO: 4219/65

BRIEFS

GUERRILLAS LIBERATE COMMUNE IN SIEM REAP--After disrupting their communications and transport lines and inflicting heavy losses on the Vietnamese enemy, on 5 June our national army and guerrillas liberated and captured Popel commune in Sot Nikom District of Siem Reap Province. This commune is composed of 15 villages, namely, Thnal Trong, (Kou Kokieng), Trav, Krasang, (Chhneat Chrum), Popol Lech, Kriel Pong, Kouk Samlei, Damrei Kon, (Trach Touch), (Trapeang Phong), Trapeang Chong, (Teapeang Throm), (Chey Mean), and Damdek Thmei. Long live our valiant and courageous national army, guerrillas and people on Sot Nikom District of Siem Reap Province! [Text] [BK271133 (Clandestine) Voice of Democratic Kampuchea in Cambodian 2330 GMT 26 Jun 83]

SRV CONVOY AMBUSHED IN SIEM REAP--On 8 June our national army and guerrillas ambushed a truck convoy carrying Vietnamese troops from Siem Reap to Kouk Dong on the Siem Reap battlefield. We set ablaze three trucks near Phum Svay. Nine Vietnamese soldiers on the trucks were killed and 10 others were wounded. We seized a soviet-made AK, 300 AK rounds, 2 magazines and a quantity of war materiel. [Text] [BK241013 (Clandestine) Voice of Democratic Kampuchea in Cambodian 2330 GMT 23 Jun 83]

CSO: 4212/44

UNITED STATES ASSAILED; SOLIDARITY WITH SANDINISTS AFFIRMED

Vientiane PASASON in Lao 29 Mar 83 p 4

[Commentary: "The United States Is the Ringleader Against Nicaragua"]

[Text] At the end of March 1983 the Nicaraguan situation was increasingly serious, which was the result of the policy of intervention and aggression by the Reagan clique in power in the United States. They are behind the Honduran officials in the invasion of the northern border of Nicaragua. The American imperialists have shamelessly set up an economic blockade against Nicaragua, threatened it militarily, cut off economic aid, and slandered Nicaragua in politics and foreign affairs.

The U.S. and the Honduran reactionaries are primarily responsible for the attacks against Nicaragua. Such wicked deeds seriously violate the basic principles of international law. It is a violation of the security and of the territorial integrity of an independent state. The Honduran officials' operations supported by the United States have caused the already-serious Central American situation to become even more serious, which is a threat to peace and security in this part of the world.

With utmost hatred, the native Nicaraguan Indians, masters of the land who have a heritage of persistence and courage since the 15th century, have risen up strongly to fight the invaders, causing them one defeat after another. World opinion has assailed American imperialist aggression and their reactionary henchmen who support their aggression, and has supported the persistent and brave struggle of the Nicaraguan people against military aggression by the American imperialists and their henchmen [as published].

The Nicaraguan people, under the correct and resolute leadership of the Sandinist National Liberation Front set up by Carlos Fonseca and the Government of National Reconstruction led by Daniel Ortega, are fighting against the North American imperialists who are threatening, intervening, and invading militarily. They have been practicing political slander and deception along with using their henchmen in the area, hoping to destroy and overthrow the Nicaraguan revolutionary power. The Nicaraguan people will undoubtedly obtain victory.

The Lao and Nicaraguan peoples, though on different sides of the ocean, are not far from each other at all. We have the same fate and have suffered invasion and intervention by the colonialists and American imperialists. We have the same enemies: the American imperialists and the reactionary forces who collaborate against the Lao and Nicaraguan revolutions. We have the same lofty goals: peace, independence, and the construction of a new and happy life for the peace and security of all nations of the world. The Lao people always attentively follow up with their firm belief in and support of the persistent and courageous struggle, full of sacrifices and many difficulties, of our fraternal Nicaraguans in order to strive completely for the glorious victory of Nicaragua and its people. The victory of the Nicaraguan people is a strong struggle by the people in the nations of Central America, the Caribbean and Latin America, against the North American imperialists and their henchmen's murderous dictatorship, and for independence, democracy, and progress. The Lao people will stand side by side and fully support their struggle against injustice, and will support the persistence and courage of the Nicaraguan people.

9884

CSO: 4206/80

INSTRUCTION ISSUED ON NATIONAL WOMEN'S CONGRESS

BK270128 Vientiane Domestic Service in Lao 0000 GMT 25 Jun 83

[Instruction issued by secretariat of the LPRP Central Committee on 11 June]

[Text] To party committees at all levels, ministries, party and state committees, and provincial and municipal party and administrative committees throughout the country:

The women's association is a mass organization which is in line with the proletarian dictatorship system. In the recent past, the party committees and administrations at all levels, as well as all ministries and various committees, have paid attention to guiding, educating, training, consolidating and building the Patriotic Lao Women's Association [PLWA] and have created favorable conditions in many fields for it to carry out its activities to promote and expand its roles and rights to collective mastery so that it can contribute to fulfilling the two strategic duties, namely the defense of country and the building of socialism. Despite this, certain party committees and administrations have not yet come to understand the significant position, roles and responsibilities of women. They have failed to profoundly understand the resolution of the third party congress on the building, promotion, and expansion of women's rights to collective mastery. This was why, in the recent past, the party committees and administrations at many levels in many areas have failed to concentrate on organizing, rallying, educating, training, and creating favorable conditions for women to carry out their activities. Moreover, they have even underestimated fraternal women and the women's association and instead have seen only difficulties related to them. They have failed to adopt measures to assist them to positively carry out activities and fulfill tasks. They have failed to use women and their association, which constitute more than half of the people's overall strength, in contributing to the fulfillment of the tasks of defending the country and building socialism and all other tasks put forth by the party and state.

Therefore, implementing the resolution of the Third Party Congress, the party Central Committee Political Bureau has agreed to allow the mobilizing committee of the women's association to make positive preparations in all respects for the convening of the first national congress to review the PLWA's work and the activities of the Lao women, and to adopt its duties and line and

make a decision on arrangements for the activities of the Lao women in a new stage of revolution. The secretariat of the party Central Committee hereby instructs the party committees and administrations at the provincial level, all ministries, and party and state committees at all levels to pay attention to guiding the implementation of certain tasks as follows:

1. Positively guide, encourage, and assist the PLWA at all levels to join in political movements in daily life, and effectively study various resolutions and instructions of the party and state as well as of the PLWA at the central level.
2. Positively step up the revolutionary movements, for example, the movements in carrying out production and intensive cultivation, switching to agricultural cooperatives, and striving to launch emulation campaigns to fulfill the tasks entrusted by the party and state in order to score achievements to welcome the first national women's congress.
3. Through the movements to mobilize, solidify, rally, and enhance the women's strength in translating into reality the line and policies of the party and state in the immediate future, it is imperative to positively mobilize the women to take part in the rice farming and plantation movements. Following the movements, cadres must be selected, trained and developed for the vigorous and firm establishment of the Federation of Lao Women Unions in accordance with the resolution of the party Central Committee.
4. As for the PLWA central mobilizing committee, it must strive to make effective preparations and create all favorable conditions for the convening of the national women's congress. It must also guide the women's organizations at various levels to correctly and effectively implement this instruction.
5. The party committees and administrations at all levels, all ministries, and other committees attached to the party must create all conditions for all branches of the PLWA to hold their preliminary meetings.

Upon receiving this instruction, the provincial party committees and administrations, ministries, and other committees attached to the party must attentively study and organize to translate it into reality.

[Signed] Khamtai Siphandon, on behalf of the Secretariat of the LPRP Central Committee.

Vientiane, 11 June 1983.

CSO: 4206/94

SWEDES PROVIDE OXYGEN-ACETYLENE PLANT

Construction Completed

Vientiane PASASON in Lao 26 Mar 83 p 3

[Text] The joint construction of the Lao-Swedish Friendship Oxygen-Acetylene Plant whose construction and improvement began on 15 March 1981 has now been completed. A hand-over ceremony was held on the afternoon of 21 March between representatives of the Lao Government and the Kingdom of Sweden.

The project was carried out according to an agreement signed in 1980 in which the Kingdom of Sweden aided the LPDR in reviving and constructing a new oxygen and acetylene plant worth 9.1 million kronor in Vientiane.

The improvement and construction began on 15 March 1981 by improving the old construction and constructing the new acetylene plant and installing new electrical and water systems. Also, there was more worker training both domestically and abroad.

In carrying out this project the Swedish International Development Agency [SIDA] with the approval of Laos proposed that (Aka), a large Swedish company with expertise in oxygen and acetylene production, design and adopt a construction and installation plan along with training for the workers.

The Lao side signed a construction contract with the national construction company in order to construct a 15-cubic meter distribution tower, and the foundation for the acetylene plant, water storage, a water and water filtering system, and also to install water pipes and a fence around the plant and build roads and sidewalks. These were all completed in June 1982.

The success in plant improvement and construction will be an important contribution to the transformation and socialist economic construction in our country, especially to serve industry and manufacturing, for example, in heavy machinery by cutting and welding steel. In the future it will be able to serve in other parts of industry, e.g., paper and textile plants, and steel plants. In public health it will serve in surgeries and in emergencies and convalescence.

In order to maintain the machinery for production and distribution, and also to raise the level of theoretical knowledge and good practice in the plant management, SIDA along with Laos decided to sign a second-level agreement in which SIDA would give an additional 1.9-million kronor worth of aid to Laos.

This new plant now consists of 33 workers, and is able to produce over 5,000 tanks of oxygen and acetylene per year. In the future it will be able to produce 50,000 tanks per year. In the 1983 plan the plant will produce 4,500 tanks of oxygen, with over 1,000 tanks of oxygen produced in the first quarter of the year. It will produce 700 tanks of acetylene.

In the handing-over of this plant Mr Sousai Sithisai, deputy minister of industry, handicrafts and forestry, expressed thanks and great gratitude toward the Swedish Government and its people for their assistance, and hoped that the Lao-Swedish friendship and cooperation would continuously and endlessly expand for the interests of both countries.

Turnover Ceremony

Vientiane PASASON in Lao 23 Mar 83 pp 1, 3

[Text] On the evening of 21 March in Vientiane Capital a ceremony was held to turnover the Lao-Swedish friendship oxygen-acetylene plant. Mr Nousia Sithisai, deputy minister of industry, manufacturing and forestry, gave a speech accepting it and Mr (Masobeu), charge d'affaires of the Kingdom of Sweden in Laos, gave a speech to turn over the plant.

Honored guests who attended this handing-over ceremony were Mr Maisouk Saisoumpheng, minister of industry, manufacturing and forestry, along with concerned high-level cadres and many invited guests.

Mr (Kan Bektin), SIDA representative in Laos, along with Swedish experts on different projects also attended.

Previously this plant could only produce oxygen with the old and broken-down machinery left by the old regime. Production was struggling along and was not able to meet the demands of society. In 1980, by seeing the great importance of the plant the LPDR and the Swedish Governments signed an agreement to revive the old oxygen plant and to build an acetylene and a new oxygen plant worth a total of 9.1 million kronor. It took almost 18 months to complete the construction.

The acetylene and oxygen production is of greatest value for the economy and society now, as well as in the future of Laos, for example, to serve in industry, manufacturing, and public health, and to steadily raise the standard of people of all ethnic groups.

In 1983 this plant will produce 4,500 tanks of oxygen with over 1,000 tanks produced in the 1st quarter of the year. It will produce 700 tanks of acetylene.

On this occasion, Mr Nousai Sithisai thanked and expressed great gratitude toward the Swedish Government and its people for their assistance, and hoped that the friendship and cooperation between Laos and Sweden would continuously and endlessly grow in the interests of both countries. Later, after giving a socialist unit flag to the national construction unit No 1, the third-level labor medal to 1 comrade, and a ministry commendation to 12 comrades, Minister Maisouk Saisompheng cut the ribbon and invited the guests to tour the plant and its operations.

9884

CSO: 4206/80

FRONT MESSAGE TO KPRP ON FOUNDING ANNIVERSARY

BK291405 Vientiane Domestic Service in Lao 0000 GMT 29 Jun 83

[Text] On 27 June the Lao Front for National Construction [LFNC] Central Committee sent a message to the KUFNCD Central Committee in the capital of Phnom Penh saluting and greeting the 32d founding anniversary of the KPRP. The message reads in full as follows:

On the occasion of the celebration of the 32d founding anniversary of the KPRP, the LFNC Central Committee and the Lao people of all tribes extend warm and cordial salutations and greetings to the KUFNCD Central Committee and the heroic Kampuchean people.

The Lao people are very happy to learn that within a short period of time the heroic Kampuchean people, under the correct leadership of the KPRP and enjoying the positive and effective support and assistance of Vietnam, Laos, the Soviet Union, and other countries in the socialist community and of the progressive people in the world, have surmounted various difficulties and trials in their national restoration and recorded great achievements in their cause of national defense and construction.

The PRK's international prestige has been daily upheld. This reflects heavy setbacks suffered by the Beijing reactionaries who are colluding with the U.S. imperialists and other reactionary forces in using the Pol Pot clique and Sihanouk--their (?trump) card--in the hope of hoodwinking public opinion and reversing the situation in Kampuchea. The Seventh Summit Conference of the Nonaligned Countries, the International Consultative Conference on Peace in Kampuchea, and many other important events clearly show the miraculous revival and ever more important role and status of the RPK, thereby indicating the new position and irreversible situation in Kampuchea.

The recent withdrawal of Vietnam's Cuu Long Corps further affirms the just stand and good intentions of Vietnam and Kampuchea for the special solidarity among Laos, Vietnam and Kampuchea and for peace and stability in Southeast Asia. It also shows that the situation in Kampuchea is extremely stable and is being improved.

The above great successes of the Kampuchean revolution are the successes of the spirit of profound patriotism and unyielding struggle of the Kampuchean people under the leadership of a genuine Marxist-Leninist party. They are the successes of the special militant solidarity among the three Indochinese countries, of the socialist community with the Soviet Union as its bulwark, and of the world revolution.

The Lao people are very proud of the glorious fruits gained by the fraternal Kampuchean people and wish that they win new, greater successes. The Lao people and the LPNC will continue to do everything to strengthen and consolidate the special solidarity with the fraternal Kampuchean people and are resolved to stand by your side forever.

May the great friendship, special militant solidarity and all-round fraternal cooperation between Laos and Kampuchea and among Laos, Kampuchea and Vietnam last forever!

CSO: 4206/94

COOPERATIVE MOVEMENT ASSESSED; FUTURE PLANS DESCRIBED

Vientiane PASASON in Lao 23 May 83 p 2

[Article: "The Movement To Change to Agricultural Cooperative In 1983"]

[Excerpts] The movement to change to agricultural cooperatives originated with the party Central Committee and the Council of Ministers, which issued a policy in 1978. There has been a violent struggle between the socialist and capitalist paths. At present, there are a total of 1,900 cooperatives in the country. This is 17 percent of the families in the country.

In general, the expansion of agricultural cooperatives is proceeding at different rates in the country. Also, expansion is not proceeding as a movement to the extent it should be. Some of the agricultural cooperatives have followed the principles for establishing agricultural cooperatives in accord with the policies of the party and state and this has enabled their activities to proceed well. Production and incomes have clearly increased from when people engaged in individual production. There has been good support from the members. But other cooperatives have never carried on things seriously or distributed the profits in accord with the policies of the party and state. Some places call themselves agricultural cooperatives, but their form of organization, their activities and the division of labor are not in accord with cooperative stipulations. This has led to a loss of trust among the cooperative members. Some agricultural cooperatives have failed only a few months after they were organized. The reason for this is that the cadres, cooperative members and farmers do not have a deep understanding of the policies of the party and state. That is, they do not understand the stipulation on building and organizing cooperatives. This is the thing that must be corrected first, in order to correct the other weaknesses that still exist on other fronts. This must be done by doing things in strict accord with the resolution of the Third Plenum of the Lao People's Revolutionary Party and working diligently to increase agricultural production in order to have good yields in the 1983 season and to create the conditions necessary for having people join cooperatives in 1984 and 1985 in accord with the First National 5-Year Plan. The resolution of the Third Plenum of the party Central Committee, third session, has stipulated that, in 1983, the existing cooperatives must be improved, the cooperatives that have failed must be restored and cooperatives must be expanded into areas where conditions are suitable. At the same time, attention must be given to improving cooperative production methods in order to complete the task of getting the farmers in the farming areas to join agricultural cooperatives.

Concerning improving the existing cooperatives, progress must be made and things must be made stronger. That is, first of all, attention must be given to political tasks and to training the farmers, cadres and cooperative members so that they understand that only by forming cooperatives that engage in cooperative production will it be possible to increase production. This will strengthen their faith in the party's leadership and induce more people to join cooperatives. At the same time, the activities carried on in accord with the policy for switching to cooperatives must be checked on concerning collective and private property and inspected. The rental system and the policy on dividing yields must be followed correctly. Besides this, inspections must be made to determine whether the crops grown and the livestock raised are suited to the climatic conditions. Also, varieties of fruits that are suited to the climate must be chosen in order to obtain greater yields so that the farmers earn higher incomes, which will induce more farmers to take part in cooperative production.

In order to assure that the cooperative members will be compensated for their labor, the committee in charge of agricultural cooperatives must make detailed plans, and there must be democracy in order to manage production. In making suitable plans, attention must be focused on various aspects such as land, production capabilities, amounts of each type of crop produced, kind of livestock, handicrafts and the past work system in order to help make new plans. If this is done, it will be possible to have an efficient plan that is in harmony with reality.

The thing that must go hand in hand with improving the agricultural cooperatives is switching to new scientific and technical methods in production. The fields must be divided so as to be used more and more for intensive cultivation. Besides this, improving the agricultural cooperatives and opening more cooperatives is related to expanding the family economy of the members and having the cooperative members make use of the land during the period when the cooperatives are not using the land. This must be done in order to teach them how to raise livestock and increase the incomes of the cooperative members.

All administrative echelons, the agricultural officials, the agricultural cooperative members, the cadres, the soldiers and the people in general must actively study and understand the plans, policies and stipulations on improving and building agricultural cooperatives. They must do things in strict accord with the stipulations of the party and state so that agriculture in our country makes progress and expands in order to establish agricultural cooperatives throughout the country.

11943

CSO: 4206/84

REGULATION ON PRIVATE PETROLEUM SALES REPEATED

Vientiane VIENTIANE MAI in Lao 25 May 83 pp 2, 4

[Conversations with the Editor column: "Illegal Fuel Dealers Should be Supressed"]

[Text] Dear sir: I have a question to ask:

Why is petroleum sold along some streets and at some of the small markets, particularly in Vientiane? When Vientiane Capital was formed, this was announced in the newspaper and everybody knows about it. Why aren't people doing things in accord with this? I hope you can help answer this for me.

Phonsavat Gnaowalat, civil aviation sector.

Dear Mr Phonsavat, concerning your question, actually, VIENTIANE MAI has already discussed this based on the resolution of the party committee and the Vientiane Capital Administrative Committee and, in particular, the lines of our party and state, in order to maintain security and order in society, particularly in Vientiane Capital.

The resolution on controlling petroleum, which was recently published, clearly states that private individuals, stores and merchants are absolutely prohibited from storing and selling petroleum at their homes or stores.

This is to prevent fires from breaking out. Besides this, it will help maintain order and help people act in accord with the principles stipulated by officials. According to this resolution, this has been in effect since the end of 1982. There have been cases of stores and people hiding hoarding and selling petroleum. This violates this resolution.

Because of this, first of all, there must be training seminars to inform people about the dangers of this to both themselves and the public in general.

Administrative officials close to the bases and security officials should grasp the contents of this resolution in order to inform people about this and have them obey this resolution absolutely. This phenomenon must be completely wiped out. The purpose of this is to create order and have people follow the orders strictly.

What has been said here is at the heart of creating a planned livelihood that is clear and wonderful in our society. Thank you for being worried about this. This is a problem about which all people in Vientiane Capital are worried. We will definitely not allow certain selfish people to cause trouble and violate the ownership rights of the people. Thank you.

11943

CSO: 4206/84

OIL TRANSPORT CORPORATION RESULTS REPORTED

Vientiane VIENTIANE MAI in Lao 24 May 83 p 2

[Feature: "Oil Transport Corporation No 4"]

[Text] The Tha Deua Port in Hatsaifong District, Vientiane Capital, is located at Kilometer 9. You will see oil tankers parked in rows behind and beside a large building. This is Oil Transport Corporation No 4, which is subordinate to the Transnational Transport Corporation, Ministry of Communications and Posts.

During the conference to summarize the results of the work in 1982 and the 1st quarter of 1983, which was held on 21 May 1983, Mr Khamphan Thimmawan, the head of this corporation, reported on the oil transport activities in 1982 and the 1st quarter of 1983. He told reporters that in 1982, the corporation, known as the transport division, was composed of 4 sectors and had 86 workers. But in 1983, it was reorganized into 6 sections with 109 workers.

The duty of this corporation is to transport oil both within and outside the country, for example, [from] the Socialist Republic of Vietnam.

Transport Activities In 1982

In 1982, the workers emulated in carrying out the duties given them by the officials. They satisfactorily completed the tasks given them. For example, they transported a total of 1,827 truckloads or 8,055 cubic meters, which in tons is equivalent to 1,368,132 cubic meter-kilometers or ton-kilometers.

After organizing the corporation, during the first 3 months of 1983, the corporation was able to make 404 vehicle trips, or 3,880 cubic meters or tons or 1,259,420 cubic meter-kilometers or ton-kilometers.

As for transport in 1982, profits increased 60 percent. As for the 1st quarter of 1983, gross receipts have increased 60 percent as compared with all of 1982.

During the 1st quarter of 1983, a total of 546 vehicles were repaired. A total of 11 tires, 108 "ok chi" [translation unknown] and 30 batteries were repaired and 241 vehicles were given lubrications.

Security Activities

A special goal and duty of this corporation is to transport fuel, goods and strategic chemical materials. Because the enemy is always trying to cause trouble, the drivers must carry out two tasks, that is, they must both drive the vehicles and serve as guards. To date, they have worked as guards a total of 450 days, or 10,800 hours. They have protected the long-distance convoys, working 7 to 17 days in 7 different localities, such as Louang Nam Tha, Oudomsai, Luang Prabang, Sayaboury Provinces, and the Phon Tieu mine, Phin District and Da Nang. They have made a total of 4,058 vehicle-trips. That is, each long-distance convoy averages 18 vehicles or more, and makes about 220 trips.

Besides this, many other results have been achieved by the workers at this corporation, who have striven to do the work.

Mr Khamphan Thimmawan also told the reporters that the reason that the workers at this corporation have been able to score these achievements is that all the workers deeply respect the line and policies of the party and state, particularly the resolution of the Third Party Plenum. The workers have given great attention to and continually followed the recommendations. At the same time, they have worked diligently. They have a great sense of responsibility, they have been able to make decisions to overcome the obstacles, they have strong solidarity and they strongly oppose bad ideology. They have continually done their jobs and completed the tasks.

In carrying out the work during 1982 and the 1st quarter of 1983, 26 workers did an outstanding job. Representing their fellow workers, they went and proudly received a letter of commendation from Mr Bouasi Loxansai, the first deputy minister of communications and posts, amidst the applause of their fellow workers and the other guests at a festive ceremony.

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CSO: 4206/84

VIENTIANE CHAIRMAN ORDERS REAL ESTATE REPORTING

Vientiane VIENTIANE MAI in Lao 7 Mar 83 p 2

[Article: "Announcement by the Vientiane Capital Administrative Committee"]

[Text] So that administrative authorities will inspect and register privately-owned land and houses in Vientiane Capital in order to guarantee the legal property of the people, the Vientiane Capital Administrative Committee has issued the following announcement:

1. The owners of land and houses, regardless of whether they are state employees, soldiers, police, ordinary citizens or foreigners, must take their property registration certificates and house construction permits and present them at the Department of Lands and Houses, Ministry of Finance, within the time limit stipulated.
2. People who purchased their houses from others before or after national liberation must present their purchase contract and registration certificate.
3. Concerning houses that belong to people who have fled or who have not lived there before or since national liberation, the people living in or looking after the house must go and report. But if they have a certificate of transfer from the absent owner, that document must also be presented too.
4. Concerning houses rented to others, regardless of whether they are rented to an organization, an office, to individuals, to foreigners such as diplomats or to international organizations, the owner must present the rental contract and the land certificate.
5. Concerning houses built after national liberation, regardless of whether they are made of wood or clay, the owners must present their land certificate and construction permit if they have them. If they do not have these documents, they must still go and make a report.
6. As for government-owned houses that have been turned over to cadres, state employees, workers, soldiers and police to live in and take care of, there will be a separate inspection and registration later on.

7. The deadlines for making inspections and registering property are as follows: Saisettha and Chanthabouli Districts will do this between 14 February 1983 and 16 March 1983. The deadlines for other districts will be stipulated later.

8. If the deadline is exceeded, land and house owners are in violation of the law.

Vientiane Capital

7 February 1983

Representative of the Vientiane Capital Administrative Committee

Chairman, Phao Phimphachan

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CSO: 4206/84

VIENTIANE MONG DISTRICT MASS ORGANIZATION WORK CITED

Vientiane PASASON in Lao 7 Mar 83 pp 2, 3

[Article by Thalangsini: "The New Life of the People in Hom District"]

[Excerpts] The beautiful golden sun at daybreak is shining through the fog covering the peaks of Phou Gnom and Phou Bia Noi mountains that surround Hom District [Vientiane Province]. The fog has lifted and now the sun is bringing warmth. Sister Notho, the head of the Hom District Women's Association, told me that there are 6,942 women in Hom District, which has a total population of 13,985.

At present, the Hom District Women's Association has 266 members. Each year, there are 5 or 6 membership drives. Concerning association administration, even though there are difficulties because of the fact that members live far apart and it is difficult for people from different cantons to meet each other, they are carrying on things as usual.

Sister Notho also said that, in the future, they will continue to improve things and make progress and expand membership. At the same time, the number of members and their quality will be guaranteed. They will follow the path and expand on the good traditions handed down by our forefathers. The heritage of heroic Hom District is forever of heroic Laos. Our women are united and cooperate in emulating for the revolution. Whenever there are ceremonies such as National Day, the anniversary of the Party and Army Day, the women play both a material and spiritual part, that is, they are diligent and they emulate. In particular, in defending our area, they have helped send materials to the fighters who are defending Hom District. With great diligence last year, the women helped take 475 kilograms of rice and 20 kilograms of meat to the fighters; 185 went and helped the fighters with various activities. Besides this, they also sent various vegetables, utensils, cigarettes and daily necessities.

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CSO: 4206/84

NEW BRICK FACTORY BUILT WITH SRV AID

Vientiane PASASON in Lao 24 Mar 83 p 2

[Article: "New Brick Factory"]

[Text] In the southern-most part of downtown Saravane there is a small recently opened factory that was aided by the twin province Quang Nam-Da Nang of our fraternal socialist [neighbor] Vietnam. Every day we can hear the machines operating. The picture that demonstrates success is the solidly packed piles and rows of bricks which are continually being transported from the factory to different places.

During working hours they all struggle seriously to carry out their duty, for example, the section for grading dirt, the section for feeding it into the machinery, and the section that carries [bricks] out to dry in the sun. They all work in coordination and continue without interruption. As Comrade Bounmi, the chief who is responsible for this factory told us, these workers had no previous experience with this type of machinery, but after only a little over a month they decided to struggle and gradually learn on the job. Since the start of production they have been able to produce 70,000 bricks. He added that this is because the experts that were sent by Quang Nam-Da Nang attentively and sincerely helped our Lao workers as if we were members of the same family. During working hours these experts were there with our Lao workers. [In the case where] the provincial workers had never done things before, these experts would do it and let the Lao workers try later. They worked and also supervised at the same time. Regardless of the hour for a break they also consulted and continually give advice to the Lao workers. Comrade Han, a representative of the experts from Quang Nam-Da Nang Province, said that their team of experts was appointed by the Quang Nam-Da Nang Province party committee and administrative committee to help the Lao workers in Saravane Province in brick-making techniques. When they first arrived they were warmly welcomed by the party committee and the provincial administrative committee. When they worked in cooperation with the Lao workers, the Lao workers gave love and solidarity as though they were members of one family. They love the Lao workers most. They sincerely learned everything they did not know, [as published] and they themselves were ready to teach them as much as they could in order to help the Lao workers to be able to produce at the fastest rate.

9884

CSO: 4206/80

SRV-AIDED ROUTE 6 OPENED TO TRAFFIC

Vientiane PASASON in Lao 18 Mar 83 p 2

[Article by Dok Fang Deng: "The Friendship Route"]

[Text] The thick clouds from the night gradually disappeared. The sun of a new dawn rose above the horizon and sent out its golden rays. It was a very bright red, as red as the bricks being baked. The coolness was blown away, and the warmth was gradually creeping in.

On the morning of that day (10 March 1983), in Ban Ban, Kham District, Xieng Khouang Province, everything was decorated with beautiful colors and it really enlivened the hand-over ceremony for route 6 from Ban Ban to Nam Neun.

In this cheerful ceremony, on the Lao side there were Mr Phao Bounnaphon, alternate member of the party Central Committee, Minister of Transportation and Posts; Mr Yong Gniaya, deputy party secretary and also Xieng Khouang provincial administrative committee chairman; and Mr Savan, Kham District administrative committee chairman, along with many concerned deputy ministers and cadres. On the Vietnamese side there were Nguyen Nam Hai, deputy minister of Communications and Transportation; Mr Dam Xuan Doung, economics attache; Mr Le Hyu Vi, the SRV acting charge d'affaires in Laos; and Mr Le Ngoc Hoan, director of the Route 8 Federated Construction Company, along with honored cadres and workers of Vietnam who also attended this ceremony.

After listening to the summary of this route's construction by Mr Le Ngoc Hoan, Mr Phao Bounnaphon and Mr Nguyen Nam Hai took turns giving speeches for the official hand-over.

In part of Mr Phao Bounnaphon's speech he said "this route was built and accomplished with great sacrifice, sweat, energy, intelligence, blood, materials, and a great deal of equipment, along with deep love and solidarity friendship. Great value and a beautiful appearance are related to this route, and there are ineradicable memories in the Lao people's hearts of carrying out the bright proletarian internationalist duty of the cadres and workers. In the construction the Vietnamese struggled against the rains and cold winds, and bites by snails, mosquitos, and horseflies; they climbed mountains and went through marshes. They were away from their homeland, their families, and their own homes, and they worked diligently and actively. All this has become a valuable inheritance to be handed over to our Lao people."

The route 6 construction was aided by the Socialist Republic of Vietnam and started in October 1974. It is 86.2 km long and 6 meters wide. Its base width is 8 meters. There are 2 reinforced steel bridges of 66.38 meters, 266 water pipes of all kinds 3,139 meters long, and 8,566 meters of drainage ditches. On 20 December 1982 this route construction was gloriously completed.

Route 6 is an old road that was built in 1934. It was bombed by the American imperialists causing great damage which can still be seen. This route, however, is in a mountainous area with high mountains, deep abysses, dense forests trickling water and collapsing soil. Moreover, during the construction period the transportation was guaranteed as visual; the geography and the change in weather affected their health. All these were great difficulties and obstacles for the construction, but with a spirit of diligence and high sacrifice they overcame the difficulties for bright proletarian internationalism. The cadres and workers in the SRV construction companies, especially the 2 companies 674 and 572, and the bridge construction company No 75, all put their energy and capability into constructing and digging in the mountains, filling marshes and ditches, building bridges, and paving. They carried out beautifully their lofty duty until they succeeded as planned.

The success of the route 6 construction from Ban Ban to Nam Neun is once again a mark of the special solidarity between the two parties, governments, and the people of Laos and Vietnam that steadily and solidly increases and endlessly expands. It also is an advantageous condition for the expansion of economics and transportation and steadily raising the standard of living of the people of all ethnic groups in Xieng Khouang Province and also in the northern region.

9884

CSO: 4206/80

BRIEFS

SAVANNAKHET GUERRILLAS--Kengkok Canton is east of Sepone District which adjoins the Vietnamese border. After the nationwide liberation, instead of living happily under the sky of the new regime, the people in Kengkok Canton have been unendingly schemed against by reactionaries who are supported by reactionaries abroad and the imperialists. They hope to wipe out our young regime. Therefore, to respond to this new situation the Kengkok Canton guerrillas have changed their company to a battalion in order to achieve their task in this new phase. Their brave and glorious heritage has become a stimulus and also a valuable lesson for them in training the guerrilla battalion to become strong and progressive along with the advancing new regime. The Kengkok guerrilla battalion is a descendant of the wartime guerrilla company. Even though they are confronting new situations they still maintain their fine heritage in bearing arms and also spades and plows. Now their battalion is even more solid in personnel, firmer in ideology, and richer in their own guerrilla battalion training experiences. Though the reactionaries have been using many forms of tricks they have not been able to infiltrate and sneak into the Kengkok Canton area. Now the Kengkok Canton people are prouder than anything else of the progress and strength of the guerrilla unit in their canton. They all live happily and peacefully and feel free to make their living and to increase their production. Now the Kengkok Canton guerrilla unit is attentively operating tirelessly to defend their home town. They have volunteered to fulfill their duty in defending their hometown as befitting the people's trust in them. [Excerpts] [Vientiane PASASON in Lao 28 Mar 83 p 2] 9884

XIENG KHOUANG DISTRICT POPULATION, HOSPITAL--Nong Het is a medium-sized district in Xieng Khouang Province. Its total area is 28,500 square kilometers. It is a land of plenty and richness of natural resources. On the east it adjoins Nghe Tinh in Vietnam; the west adjoins Kham District; the northeast adjoins Santai, Houa Phan Province; and the southwest adjoins Khammouan Province. Its total population is 23,592 people. It is divided into 9 cantons, 109 villages, and 3,150 families. There are 3 major ethnic groups: Lao Loum, Lao Theung and Lao Soung. For public health in the district alone there is a standard hospital, aided in construction by its twin province, Nghe Tinh (Vietnam), containing 50 beds in all. Besides this standard hospital, Nong Het District also has 3 additional canton hospitals in Keobon, Houai Kham, and Phakboun. Now they have 20 beds. Meanwhile, almost all villages also have their own regular medicine supplies. [Excerpts] [Vientiane PASASON in Lao 24 Mar 83 p 2] 9884

CHAMPASAK GUERRILLA OPERATIONS--Dong Gngang Canton, Phon Thong District, Champasak Province, has 14 villages; its border adjoins the mountain range at the Lao-Thai border. According to what Mr Di, the canton administrative committee chairman, told us, 56 comrades throughout this canton are LPRYU members. But the Youth Union in this district has outstanding tasks in many areas, e.g., in national defense and public security. Things are getting basically peaceful, as Comrade Boun Nam Chanphouang, a canton Youth Union committee member and canton administrative committee member who is responsible for national defense and is also posted to the canton military command committee, told our NOUM LAO reporter. He also said that in 1982 they made 2 big operations by joining the regional forces (district military) and other cantons, and also 487 small operations. They fought, against the enemies twice, which claimed 7 enemy lives, and they seized 33 weapons, 2 M-18 mines, 2 B-41 rockets, 2 M60 rounds and some equipment. For production, the Dong Gngang Canton Youth Union committee plans to create a treasury to help the guerrilla families when they are faced with shortages, and also to accumulate allowances for those who carry out Youth Union work. As for the outstanding work in national defense and socialist construction, last year the Dong Gngang Youth Union was selected as outstanding in the district by the Phon Thong District Youth Union committee. [Excerpts] [Vientiane PASASON in Lao 18 Mar 83 p 3] 9884

AFGHAN LEADERS SEND THANKS--Vientiane, 23 Jun (KPL)--Kaysone Phomvihan, general secretary of the CC of the Lao People's Revolutionary Party and chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Lao PDR, and Souphanouvong, president of the republic, of the People's Supreme Assembly, recently received a message of thanks jointly sent from Babrak Karmal, general secretary of the CC of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan and president of the Revolutionary Council of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, and Sultan Ali Keshtmand, chairman of the Council of Ministers of the DRA. The Afghan leaders expressed thanks to the Lao leaders for the latter's congratulatory message on the occasion of the 5th anniversary of the April Revolution of DRA. The Afghan leaders also emphasized the need to further develop the fraternal relations and cooperation between the parties, governments and peoples of Laos and Afghanistan, for the interest of the two peoples and for the consolidation of the forces of progress, peace and social justice. [Text] [BK231311 Vientiane KPL in English 0902 GMT 23 Jun 83]

CHAMPASAK DISTRICT POPULATION, SECURITY--Moun [Mounlapamok] District is 1 of the 10 districts in Champasak Province. It is composed of 5 cantons, 55 villages and 3,399 families. It has a total population of 21,482. It has constantly performed the national defense and security activities well. The youths, guerrilla units and people have been masters in maintaining public security and national defense in their zones. Moun District is a district that borders both Thailand and Kampuchea. This is an area where the enemy has tried to create disorder and to disrupt the daily lives of the people. Because of these problems, the Moun District guerrilla units have been strengthened and can protect their territory and maintain order. They have worked selflessly and have risked their lives to defend the area. [Text] [Vientiane PASASON in Lao 21 May 83 p 2] 11943

FRIENDSHIP FLAG TO USSR EXPERTS--On the afternoon of 27 June, the Ministry of Construction presented its friendship flag to experts of the Soviet assistance team in Laos as a gesture of gratitude and acclamation for their assistance in surveying and designing Route 9 in Savannakhet Province. The surveying and designing work was completed in mid-June 1983. The friendship flag was presented by Brig Gen Khemphon Phouipaseut, acting minister of construction, and was received by (Viktor Banakhiev), head of the Soviet team in charge of surveying the construction of Route 9. Present were Seun Phetsanghan, deputy minister of construction; (Constantin Sepanov), USSR economic attache to Laos; and some senior cadres concerned from both sides. The Soviet team began its work in Laos in June 1982 and will leave for home soon. [Text] [BK291524 Vientiane Domestic Service in Lao 0000 GMT 29 Jun 83]

CSO: 4206/94

PROSPECTS OF IMPROVEMENT IN U.S.-MALAYSIAN RELATIONS

Kuala Lumpur BUSINESS TIMES in English 10 Jun 83 p 19

[Article by A. Kadir Jasin]

[Text]

MALAYSIA-US relations, which in the last few years has been clouded by a stalemate on the question of GSA tin disposal, may very well see better days ahead.

Both sides now appear more anxious than ever to seek lasting solutions to the tin issue and to place their relations on a wider and more realistic foundation.

This should not however be taken to mean that the thorns which litter the path towards a more mutual and equitable relationship have suddenly disappeared. On the contrary, the irritations are still there.

What the two sides appear to be doing is to recognise the presence and nature of these irritations and to work their way around them. They seem willing to acknowledge the legitimacy of the issues in dispute from each other's standpoint.

Taking GSA tin disposal to be the major source of disagreement as an example, the emerging trend would suggest that Malaysia would accept its legitimacy from the US point of view while the US would treat Malaysia's opposition as being totally justified from its national standpoint.

But accepting the validity of each other's line does not provide any solution if left at that. What both sides should do is to use this as a basis for negotiations which may or may not produce the desired solution.

Business Times understands such an understanding had been achieved during a series of meetings held in Washington between senior US officials and a high-powered Malaysian team which secretly visited the US capital in May.

The mission, although privately organised, is understood to have gone to Washington with the blessings of the Prime Minister, Datuk Seri Dr Mahathir Mohamad.

Good clue

Among the officials and organisations consulted in Washington were Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia and Pacific Affairs, Mr Paul Wolfowitz, the GSA, the US Chamber of Commerce and several Congressmen with interests in Asian affairs.

The exact nature of issues raised in the various discussions are not clear but in the case of tin, an earlier statement on the

matter by the Prime Minister was a good clue. He said Malaysia would consider buying GSA tin if its disposal time was known.

Even the disgruntled tin miners, who in the past squarely blamed the US for destabilising the market by selling its stockpile tin, had somewhat softened their stand against the US.

Encik Abdul Rahim Akl, president of the States of Malaya Chamber of Mines, went on record during the chamber's annual general meeting last month to acknowledge the prerogative of the US authorities to dispose of surplus tin.

Nevertheless, said Encik Rahim, it would be beneficial to the industry at large if the impact of the disposal could be minimised through a clearly defined and phased disposal programme.

Malaysia has all along held the view that GSA tin, as it represents a long term source of supply, should be viewed and managed in the same way as a mine with a finite life instead of allowing it to become a political football, subject to numerous fluctuations in objectives and disposal

programmes.

What tin producers would like to see is Washington phasing its disposals from the GSA "mine" over an agreed period of years at predetermined annual rates commensurate with the overall supply and demand position and consistent with the contingent operations of the buffer stock manager.

In this way, said Encik Rahim, the uncertainty and irregularity of GSA sales would be eliminated in favour of an established and consistent programme which could be taken into consideration in the overall tin position, thus removing the one major imponderable faced by the ITC in its calculation of long term supply and demand trends.

Members of the May mission are reluctant to discuss the content of their deliberations in Washington. One member said a report comprising some recommendations would be submitted to Dr Mahathir.

Business Times understands that the idea of seeking a new framework for Malaysia-US relations is not new. Dr Mahathir, although he

shows little excitement in the relations with US, had expressed misgivings about the way the relations between the two countries was being conducted.

While he disliked the US' patronising attitude and its apparent lack of understanding of the problems of the developing countries, he recognised that relations with US should not be placed on such a narrow base as a commodity.

Dr Mahathir is the only Asean leader who has not visited Washington although as the Prime Minister had gone to New York to address the UN General Assembly.

Blame

Sources close to Dr Mahathir said whether or not the Prime Minister would make an official visit to the US would depend very much on the outcome of the new initiative. If Washington is forthcoming in showing greater understanding and readiness to take appropriate remedial actions, he may be more keen to make such a trip.

The feeling in Malaysia is that Washington had failed to understand the severity of economic,

social and security implications of its actions, including the sales of tin from its stockpile, on developing countries. While the effect of the disposal on the US economy is meagre, this is not so for tin producing countries, all of whom except one are developing countries.

But the blame falls not on the US alone. Malaysia shares part of it because it has not been willing to be explicit with past and present US administrations and opinion leaders like members of the Congress of the security threat resulting from the closure of tin mines.

"We are afraid to tell the truth about such a threat fearing that it might scare away investors. But we have to be realistic. Even when we don't talk of the threat, US investments have stagnated, except in the energy sector," said one source.

The mission is understood to have made candid explanations to Reagan administration officials and opinion leaders of the likely security implications of the closure of tin mines. Within the last one year, 84 mining units went out

of operation forcing nearly 7,000 people out of jobs.

These figures may be small and unimportant by US standards, but to a small country like Malaysia it is significant, even before taking into account the loss of foreign exchange and government revenue.

Stagnating US investments is another source of concern for Malaysia. Quite apart from investments in the energy sector, the inflow of US capital has stalled. According to Mida figures, paid-up capital attributable to US investors had in fact declined marginally from \$165 million at the end of 1978 to \$162 million at the end of 1980.

By contrast, the inflow of capital from Singapore, the United Kingdom, Japan and Hong Kong, the four leading in-

vestors in order of importance, rose steadily during that period. US is the fifth largest source of foreign investments for Malaysia.

In 1981, 23 projects with potential total investments of \$47 million proposed by US investors were approved by Mida compared with 14 worth \$21.8 million in 1980. US is still one of the best sources of original technology which Malaysia should not ignore as it moves into higher technology.

But whether or not the recent initiative actually leads to improved relations will depend very much on how the groundwork laid by the May mission is followed up. If both parties have intentions of improving their relationship with each other, serious attention has to be given to the issue.

YUGOSLAVIA INTERESTED IN ESTABLISHING JOINT VENTURES

Kuala Lumpur BUSINESS TIMES in English 28 Jun 83 p 2

[Text]

YUGOSLAVIA is keen to set up joint venture companies and invest in Malaysia, its out-going Ambassador to Malaysia, Mr Lazar Musicki, said yesterday.

He told Bernama Economic Service that such joint ventures would enable Yugoslavia to assist Malaysia in the transfer of technology.

He said there had been several discussions between Malaysian and Yugoslav businessmen on the possibility of setting-up joint ventures.

"However, it is still premature to disclose details at this stage," he added.

Mr Musicki, who leaves for home next week, anticipates greater cooperation between the two countries, especially in the field of economy and trade.

"This is more so following the visit of Prime Minister Datuk Seri Dr Mahathir to Yugoslavia last

month," he said.

He said that two-way trade was currently in Malaysia's favour and hoped that the trade imbalance could be rectified through counter trade.

According to Mr Musicki, Yugoslavia's imports from Malaysia amounted to about \$88 million in 1979 while exports were less than \$11.5 million.

The situation improved slightly in 1981 when Yugoslavia's exports to Malaysia amounted to about \$48.3 million and imports about \$82 million.

Malaysia's exports to Yugoslavia comprised mainly rubber while Malaysia imported mainly medical equipment and machinery from Yugoslavia.

He said although the trade figures looked "insignificant", there were indications that they would be increased, especially with the establishment of more direct

trade instead of going through third countries.

Mr Musicki said since last year, there were about 60 Yugoslav companies trading with Malaysia.

Among Yugoslav companies which had established business relations here were Energoinvest and Energo Projekt.

Energoinvest is one of Yugoslavia's largest companies specialising in the design, manufacturing and construction of power and industrial installation.

The company had successfully won the \$28 million National Electricity Board (NEB) contract in April last year for the supply and construction of 275 kv transmission lines linking Cenderiang and Rawang.

Energo Projekt, which is involved in the construction industry, is keen to participate in the north-south highway project, Shah Alam sports complex and mining in Sarawak.

CSO: 4200/562

INCREASE IN NUMBER OF BOAT PEOPLE REACHING MALAYSIA

Kuala Lumpur NEW STRAITS TIMES in English 21 Jun 83 pp 1, 2

[Text]

KUALA LUMPUR, Mon.
— The number of illegal Vietnamese immigrants landing on Malaysian shores has increased from 50 boats in the first three months of the year to between 40 and 50 boats a month.

The director of the special task force for illegal Vietnamese immigrants (Task Force VII), Mej-Jen Datuk Abdullah Shamsudin, said 50 boats with 1,755 Vietnamese arrived in April, followed by 1,488 in 42

boats last month.

Thirty-three boats with 1,377 Vietnamese arrived this month alone.

Of the total 4,620 who arrived, 1,784 have been resettled.

The number of those resettled has been falling below 1,000 a month since October last year while the number of arrivals in the first three months of this year has increased by 50 per cent compared with the same period last year, Datuk Abdullah told a Press conference today.

Most of the Vietnamese land on the shores of Terengganu. The number of arrivals is expected to increase further but this will depend on the weather and availability of boats in Vietnam.

Datuk Abdullah said Malaysia was not worried over the Vietnamese presence as third countries had pledged to receive them although no time frame had been agreed.

However, the United Nations is finding it more difficult to find resettlement for the Vietnamese because many of them lack skills and this has led to a decline in the number of those resettled in third countries.

"There are 11,463 Vietnamese immigrants in Malaysia now compared with 8,500 at the end of last year. About 80 per cent of them do not have any skill. Unlike the earlier immigrants who were mostly skilled workers and of Chinese descent, most of the ones here are native Vietnamese and are mostly farmers, fishermen and labourers.

"Third countries are generally selective and go for those with specialised or technical skills. The others who do not have skills are usually overlooked. Third countries just cannot accept them as they do not know what to do with them," said Datuk Abdullah.

The Vietnamese are also to blame for the slow resettlement rate as many have been known to make false declarations.

Many of them also do not know English and French, making it difficult for them to be resettled in their new environment.

Australia leads other countries in the number of intake this year with 1,582, followed by the United States (1,514), Canada (404), France (213), New Zealand and West Germany with 46 each.

CONCERN THAT SULTANS' RELIGIOUS RULINGS WILL ALIENATE PEOPLE

Kuala Lumpur NEW STRAITS TIMES in English 17 Jun 83 p 1

[Text]

PULAU PINANG, Thurs. — Former Prime Minister Tunku Abdul Rahman has urged the Government to consider reviewing the Constitution so as to prevent dissension between the States, particularly on matters pertaining to Islam.

The Tunku made the call today when commenting on the withdrawal of Johor, and possibly Perak, from the National Islamic Religious Council over the controversy centred on the date for the beginning of fasting.

He said the Government should remedy any weakness or inadequacy in the Constitution.

"We do not wish to see disunity among the States, especially if it stems from religion," he added.

The Tunku also expressed regret over the action by the two Sultans who had declared that Muslims in their respective States would start

fasting on Sunday — one day earlier than the rest of the country.

"The steps taken by the Sultans of Johor and Perak, although they have the power to do so, have apparently created dissension between them and their respective subjects," he said in an interview at his home in Jalan Air Raja here.

He hoped the Rulers concerned would not do anything at their whim and fancy which could affect the feelings of the people.

The Tunku, who turned 80 two months ago, also reminded Malay Rulers to take stock of the fact that their powers and sovereignty were vested upon them by the people.

"Their positions would be well safeguarded by their subjects' undivided loyalty," he added.

He said although each Ruler has the authority over religious matters in his State, it is important for the Rulers to co-operate among themselves as well as with the people.

For a small country like Malaysia, it is important that those having authority over religious matters co-operate and consult the people as the Government is elected by the people through their representatives in Parliament and the State Assemblies.

The Tunku added it was due to the people's sensitivity on Islamic religious matters that he set up the National Islamic Religious Council when he was the Prime Minister.

He said the objective of having the religious council headed by the Prime Minister was to have close rapport between the Muslims in the country and their Rulers so that whatever differences arising from religion would not cause dissension among the States.

ROYAL MALAYSIAN AIR FORCE MARKS 25TH ANNIVERSARY

Kuala Lumpur NEW STRAITS TIMES in English 1 Jun 83 p 14

[Sabry Sharif interview with Air Major General Datuk Mohamed Taib]

[Text]

How would you describe the early years of the RMAF?

The initial development of the RMAF as in any newly independent country was a case of wanting to have an air force of some kind but not knowing what it was supposed to do.

Furthermore the British Royal Air Force was still around and they played a prominent role in the defence of the country. Hence there was an insignificant defence role for the RMAF during the early years.

What was the attitude towards the air force at that time?

They found it a convenient way of moving people around. Even as the force level expanded it was not directed against any particular threat but for transporting purposes. When the helicopters came in the 1960s they were found to be more convenient than fixed wing aircraft, especially in gaining access to remote areas.

It was only in 1970 when the British decided to leave that we suddenly found ourselves a component part of the Armed Forces defending the country. We acquired the Tebuana, Sabres, F5Es and the C-130 heavy transport aircraft during the late 1960s and 1970s — giving us training, fighter, air defence and heavy transport responsibilities.

Would you say that the RMAF during this period was on the right path towards building up a credible air force?

It was really a period of groping in the dark for the Air Force. We bought the only 20 Tebuana in the world, we purchased two F5Bs (trainers) to support 14 F5Es, and we acquired six C-130 heavy transport aircraft. Then we had to buy three more later on. We were not really in control of our destiny, meaning that we did not really get what we wanted.

Surveillance

Was it because the idea of the air force as an extension of support for the Army and the Navy in their land and maritime operations was an alien concept to the defence planners?

The thinking of the people responsible for defence at that stage was still quite foreign to having an air power as part of the armed forces although by this time we had the Tebuana, Sabres, F5Es and the C-130s. The Air Force discussed air power as far back as 1973 when it wanted to buy the country's first ground attack fighter bomber, the Skyhawk.

When did the idea of air power become acceptable to the people responsible for defence?

The first serious evidence of the defence planners' acceptance of the concept of air power was the Armed Forces Modernisation and Expansion Programme (PERISTA) that started in 1979. Even then the Air Force had to do a lot of the groundwork, give a lot of examples, a lot of interpretation of events and most of all submissions after submissions of reports to influence the planners.

Events like the Arab-Israeli wars, and the more recent Israeli invasion into Lebanon and the Falklands Islands crisis however lend credibility to the Air Force's arguments for air power.

The PERISTA programme gave the Air Force a specific defence planning role. It gave the Air Force the utilisation of interceptors and ground

attack aircraft. It also led to the acquisition of a master radar and the integration of all the radars in the country to give maximum surveillance of the country's airspace.

Communications systems vital to any air force will also be improved. The programme also calls upon the Air Force to support the Army's frontline divisions, providing an umbrella for the navy and extending our own attack capabilities.

What about precision-guided munitions (PGMs) such as missiles? Are we taking serious stock of the latest developments in this field of technology and taking steps towards equipping our aircraft with PGMs?

Yes we have plans for equipping our aircraft

with PGMs. The reason being that after the Korean war in 1955 the modus operandi for fighter aircraft is to launch missiles about nine kilometres from your target. It does away with dogfights and it gives our aircraft a higher rate of survival. But you cannot talk about PGMs unless you have the money because it is going to cost you no less than \$30,000 a piece.

Training

One of your problems is finding pilots. But there are criticisms that it is of little use to have so many pilots if there are not that many aircraft in service.

We work on a system of priorities. Our emphasis is to train the personnel so that when the Government says "Go", we can go with a fast expansion programme of the Air Force. We can hold back the personnel in reserve or re-employ them in the transport squadron. But if the time comes when their skills are required they can easily go back to the fighters. In other words when the aircraft comes we will already have a pool of pilots capable of handling the aircraft.

Touching on the training programme of the RMAF, how far is it successful?

We have produced 400 per cent more pilots since the RMAF started in 1958. We have about 30 fighter weapons instructors and we are the only Asean country to have three test pilots and one flight test engineer. Our pilots record 70,000 hours of flying yearly since 1968, a figure I doubt can be challenged by other air forces in the region.

Repairs

Are we self-reliant in our training programme?

Yes. We have basic flying at RMAF Alor Setar base, helicopter flying at RMAF Keluang base, and advanced jet flying and tactical jet training at RMAF Kuantan base. We have also brought in

American Air Force instructors to teach our pilots advanced combat manoeuvres here instead of sending our pilots to the United States.

What about academic qualifications?

The upgrading of the education level of air force personnel took place about six-and-a-half years ago. Today we have 16 graduates with masters degrees in engineering, administration and logistics. Twenty-seven others have degrees in engineering and there are 74 diploma holders of engineering, logistics, administration, air traffic control, air defence, and operations.

Is the RMAF ready to undertake its own production of aircraft parts and repairs?

The RMAF is physically and mentally capable of doing it if we have all of the necessary equipment since the RMAF Alor (Air Force repairs and overhauling depot) in Subang can undertake the production. I think we have the most qualified air force technicians in the Asean region.

We have 1,000 Federal Aviation Authority certificate holders with an average pass of 96 per cent as compared to the United States national average pass of 67 per cent. But we cannot go ahead with the production of aircraft parts simply because we do not have the necessary sophisticated equipment.

The other major reason would be the financial constraints that we are experiencing now. However, to a limited extent we have been successful in helicopter assembling and fabrication of some parts of certain

types of helicopters.

Has the austerity drive badly affected the RMAF?

No. The only problem that the RMAF has is that it does not have control of its budget. If I have a damaged C-130 heavy transport aircraft, it is my responsibility to do my own servicing up to third line servicing. I am supposed to do my own repairs but if it is extensively damaged I cannot avoid but call for expertise from overseas. I don't have the facilities to make repairs on heavily-damaged aircraft. And because of that the aircraft is grounded for three years. But for the Navy, for example, they can send their ships to civilian dockyards.

Crashes

But the RMAF Gong Kedak base has been shelved. Doesn't that badly affect the Air Force?

To be fair the Government has allocated a lot of money to set up the RMAF Subang base which will be the most modern and sophisticated RMAF base. It will have all the air elements, including fighters and transport. Apart from Subang there are six other

air bases, so we can still operate effectively.

Over the last few years we had several crashes involving RMAF aircraft. The critics have said that there has been a drop in the standards of pilots. How far is this true?

It must be understood before the arrival of the Swiss PC-7 Pilatus basic trainer and the Italian MB 339 advanced jet trainer recently the RMAF was using the Bulldog and the Tebuan aircraft for pilot training. The great gap between the Bulldog and the Tebuan did not assist very much in pilot conversion to subsonic aircraft (Tebuan). And trainee pilots as learners make mistakes. In fact 47 per cent of the crashes have been due to air crew error.

Since 1960 the defence budget has been going up. Do you think that in the next seven years Malaysia is going to have a credible air force?

Yes. There are no two ways about it. We must have one credible air force, one credible navy and one credible army. The only question is whether it will affect Malaysia financially as is happening to the United States now.

NAVAL AIR WING WILL USE HELICOPTERS

Kuala Lumpur NEW STRAITS TIMES in English 27 Jun 83 p 5

[Text]

KUALA LUMPUR, Sun. — The Royal Malaysian Navy is in the process of forming its own naval air wing as part of the service's expanding operational capabilities.

With the move, the RMN is the third Asean country to form a naval air unit. Indonesia and Thailand have already set up such units.

Chief of Navy Laksmanna Madya Datuk Mohamed Eain Salleh said that the naval air wing would take shape by the end of the year.

He said that for a start, the division would have helicopter squadrons.

He added that no decision had yet been made on the particular type of helicopter to operate the new naval unit.

It is understood that the helicopters would have to be smaller than the RMAF's Nuri to enable it to operate from RMN's present and under-construction ships.

Volunteers

The naval air wing has become an important component of any modern navy today. Helicopters or aircraft operate from ships to detect and to destroy enemy ships and submarines with its arsenal of cannons, missiles and rockets.

With more and more Armed Forces resorting to submarines to enhance their naval combat capabilities, the formation of a naval air wing is a must for helicopters or aircraft to detect "waiting-to-destroy" submarines and ships.

Datuk Mohamed Zain said that the naval air wing would also act as "the eyes and ears" of a naval unit or task force during operations to ensure advance warning is given of impending enemy air or naval strike.

He said that Western Armed Forces have used the air wing to their advantage in many crisis

situations like the British in the Falkland Islands.

He added that in view of the expanding roles and responsibilities of the navy, the introduction of the new unit cannot be avoided.

The navy chief elaborated that the RMN would be calling for volunteers to join the new arm soon.

In this respect, he said, the Royal Malaysian Air Force had agreed to train pilots for the naval air division.

"However, this does not mean that RMAF will second its helicopter pilots to us.

"What we are going to have is our own navy pilots. Hence, they will be first trained as a naval officer and later as a naval pilot."

He also said that the helicopters need not be seaborne all the time, but could be stationed in naval bases and summoned to operations when the need arises.

He added that RMN's *K.D. Mahawangsa*, *K.D. Indera Sakti*, *K.D. Lekir*, *K.D. Kasturi*, *K.D. Rahmat*, *K.D. Hang Tuah* and two yet to be named off-shore patrol vessels would have helicopter decks.

K.D. Lekir, *K.D. Kasturi* and the two off-shore patrol vessels are under construction.

LOCAL COMPANIES IGNORE CZECH CREDIT LINE

Manila PHILIPPINES DAILY EXPRESS in English 30 Jun 83 p 11

[Text] A \$10-million credit line offered by Czechoslovakia to domestic industries, through the Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP), has remained untapped, indicating local borrowers' coolness to the financial package.

The credit line from the Ceskoslovenska Obchodni Bank A.S. (CSOB) was made available early last year for availment by, specifically by textile firms, interested in buying machinery and equipment from Czechoslovakia.

Milos Krivda, charge d'affaires of the Czechoslovak embassy, said his country aimed to sell industrial equipment and machinery to the Philippines via the credit arrangement.

The \$10-million credit line was designed to partly finance the acquisition of textile equipment and other machinery since a Czech, firm, Investa, was accredited by the Board of Investments (BOI) to supply equipment to local textile millers planning to expand and rehabilitate their facilities.

The non-utilization of the line was discussed during a recent meeting of the joint trade commission of the Philippines and Czechoslovakia.

The two countries now exchange certain commodities and finished products, but the Czech panel said utilization of the \$10-million credit line would "further enhance" trade between the two countries.

Besides textile machinery, the socialist country is also offering to domestic industries coal-fired power plants, ceramic plants, refractory brick plants, metallurgic machinery, leather working plants and tanneries.

CSO: 4200/683

RULING PARTY FACES DISPARATE OPPOSITION GROUPS

Kuala Lumpur BUSINESS TIMES in English 24 Jun 83 p 17

[Article by Joel Palacios in Manila]

[Text]

PHILIPPINE politics have turned into a "hearts and minds" battle between the government of President Ferdinand Marcos and outlawed Communist Party guerrillas.

The traditional political parties, including those who might now have been opposing the Marcos government, were in a shambles when the President ended eight years of martial law in 1981.

Now, they are an almost impotent voice on the sidelines, dismissed by the government as little more than debating clubs for elderly intellectuals.

They were thrown into disarray not only by martial law but by a restructuring of the parliamentary system. The congress and senate were disbanded and replaced by a national assembly controlled by the President's New Society Movement.

At the same time, according to analysts, the old political power broker system fell apart when the President's new men replaced provincial business barons and party lieutenants who used to call the shots in making and breaking policy.

This left them no easy way to dispense favours or help for people with grievances against the national or local governments.

Some political analysts believe the communist New People's Army (NPA), which has been fighting a guerilla war in the countryside, is stepping into the vacuum, appearing as the political champion of the poor and underprivileged.

The NPA has been successful in making its presence felt in the northern and southern provinces where people complain of government and military violations of human rights.

Despite repeated government statements that they are no longer a significant threat to national security, NPA units have been able to muster up to 200 men at a time to mount ambushes in remote areas against army and para-military patrols.

Opposition sources not associated with the communists estimate the NPA has about 2,000 "regulars" throughout the country and can count on the undoubted support of thousands of villagers in rural areas.

This point was made by major-general Fidel Ramos, commander of the para-military Philippine constabulary. He said in a recent confidential report that high-handed behaviour by the military was costing the government support from those the army was supposed to be protecting.

Reliable sources in areas where guerillas are active said the NPA had won support, shelter and help from villagers, less with communist propaganda and indoctrination than through apparent government neglect and army abuses.

Other political sources said that renegade priests and nuns who joined the guerillas have given the NPA a touch of acceptability among a strongly religious and normally anti-communist people. Eighty per cent of the Philippines' 50 million people are Catholics.

The church has not officially taken an adversary position against the government, but several bishops and clerics including the influential Archbishop of Manila, Cardinal Jaime Sin, have been outspoken in their criticism of what they see as excesses and extravagances by the Marcos administration.

Several church-backed groups have been associated with militant organisations which the military has identified as subversive. About 20 priests and nuns have been arrested during the past year, although many have since been released into the custody of their superiors.

One priest was killed in an encounter with security forces last year during a hunt for six clergymen and two nuns accused of being involved in a movement to topple the government.

Another priest, Conrado Balweg, publicly announced last year that he had joined the NPA. He is now reported to control remote villages in the Cordillera Mountains of Northern Luzon island and has a price of 200,000 pesos (M\$44,000) on his head.

Political sources said the lack of credibility among local government officials had created a situation where people were turning more to their parish priests with their problems. This, in turn, had led to a "politicisation" of some clergy.

Government and church leaders held a series of talks on an alleged military crackdown against politicized priests and nuns, but the dialogue ended in deadlock.

A new political group called Unido, which claimed to be the Philippines' only non-violent opposition movement, said it wanted to give "democracy a last chance" in elections for the national assembly next year.

It asked President Marcos for electoral safeguards and appealed to the NPA to lay down their arms and participate in the election.

"Let us unite and avoid a bloody revolution," said Salvador Laurel, president of Unido, the United Nationalist Democratic Organisation.

"Why should Filipinos kill each other for the sake of one man who wants to perpetuate himself in power?" he told about 2,000 people at a meeting last week in a Luzon island village known to be sympathetic to the NPA.

Laurel, a former senator and son of an ex-president, said that if Mr Marcos was concerned about the future of the Philippines he should declare an amnesty for all political offenders so they could participate in the elections and avoid a civil war.

A senior government official said Unido had little chance of making any impact against Marcos' well-entrenched ruling party, the New Society Movement.

He said Marcos had created a powerful political machine and controlled almost all aspects of Philippines society after more than 10 years in power.

"Members of the assembly will be elected on a regional basis and not from small constituencies. This will demand enormous expenses and the solid support of an efficient organisation, both of which Unido lacks," said Jose Tumbokon, Minister of State for Information.

Another minister, who asked not to be identified, said: "There is nobody in the country today who can be considered a serious threat to President Marcos. Unless something untoward happens to him, the political situation will be the same for the next 10 years." —
Reuter

BELT-TIGHTENING MEASURES NECESSARY FOR ECONOMIC IMPROVEMENT

Kuala Lumpur BUSINESS TIMES in English 25 Jun 83 p 24

[Article by Graham Lovell in Manila]

[Text]

THE Philippines government has taken a series of belt-tightening steps aimed at bringing order back into the economy and curbing a ballooning balance of payments deficit.

The measures, most notably a devaluation of the peso by 1.5 per cent according to the government's calculations or 1.25 per cent under the formula used by the International Monetary Fund (IMF), were generally welcomed by the business and banking community.

But there was also concern that a probable increase in inflation — the government spoke of a two-percentage-point rise above the present level of nearly seven per cent — would lead to labour union pressure for more pay.

Some sources wondered whether export earnings would show a marked improvement. Grain, sugar and coconut crops seem certain to be hit by this year's long drought and manufactured goods, such as garments, are largely limited by quotas set by importing countries.

"It is one thing to be able to sell more competitively but you have to have the goods to put on the market," one source said.

Measures taken by the government include adjustment of the peso rate to peg it at 11 to the US dollar, abandonment of a price subsidy system for oil products, suspension of five costly projects in a US\$6 billion industrialisation programme, and a pledge of tough action against a currency black market that was costing the government millions of dollars in lost foreign exchange.

The peso has been allowed to float against the dollar since 1976. It will still float but the central bank hopes a steady downward glide will be replaced by what one bank source described as "progressive degradation in a stable manner."

The main target of attack is a balance of payments deficit that last year hit US\$1.12 billion and this year seems likely to go well beyond the projected US\$550 million.

The government has acknowledged that the measures taken will require "discipline" — a word President Ferdinand Marcos used several times when he addressed a businessmen's lunch on Thursday to explain his government's actions — but it holds out a carrot of improved income for farmers and urban workers as well as benefits to the economy by reduced imports and higher exports.

"But a senior member of the Philippines Chamber of Commerce said business would be in a quandary because of the big change in the guiding rate.

"It will now be harder to plan than before because of the huge devaluation," he said.

"It was more manageable when the devaluation was only by one or two, or even three or four centavos but with eight centavos it will be hard to plan properly, particularly in the importation of raw materials," he told reporters.

Another source said there had probably been a lot of pressure on the government to take the measures. He cited the decision to suspend work on the five industrial projects that would have cost at

least US\$3 billion in capital expenditure.

A meeting earlier this week of Mr Marcos' ruling party, the New Society Movement, formalised a request by the World Bank and the IMF that the government cut back on its industrialisation programme in return for approval of an US\$443 million loan.

"There must have been a lot of pressure from the bank and the fund," the source said. "But all this could not have been done without agreement from the inside, from within the party caucus."

The government seems to be lowering its sights in rural and agricultural improvements, turning attention to more modest irrigation and electrification programmes.

But it is hoping also to raise a further US\$300 million from the World Bank at a meeting in Paris next month with international aid groups and other lending agencies.

"It is just possible they acted as they did when they did to convince the bank and others they are in earnest," one source said.

"I think they might do that even if they do not achieve fully one hundred per cent of what they are setting out to do.

"Mr Marcos said they must be disciplined, and I think he means it," the source added.

"But we should look it a few months from now and see how it is going." — Reuter

SAVINGS REALIZED BY GEOTHERMAL PLANTS

Manila PHILIPPINES DAILY EXPRESS in English 30 Jun 83 pp 1, 8

[Text] ISABEL, Leyte--President Marcos said yesterday that the Philippines will become the world leader in geothermal use by 1987.

The President made this prediction during the inauguration of the P340-million Tongonan geothermal power plant at symbolic ceremonies here.

"Today we take a more significant step towards our vision of national self-reliance in energy resources by the commissioning of 112.5 megawatts of geothermal energy," the President said.

Tongonan is some 60 kms. west of Tacloban City.

The President said the Philippines is at present second to Italy in geothermal use with total installed power generating capacity of 781 megawatts with the commissioning of Tongonan 1 and the Palimpinan, Negros Oriental plant in the next few days.

Under the accelerated energy program, the geothermal capacity will increase to 1661 megawatts in 1987, making the Philippines the No. 1 geothermal user.

This will represent, the President said, a displacement of 8.8 million barrels of imported oil.

AT PRESENT, the power provided by Tiwi and the Makiling-Banahaw geothermal facilities have saved the country approximately P940 million in imported oil cost in the first six months of 1983 alone, the President said.

With the operation of the two additional geothermal plants, the savings will reach at least some P2.4 billion by the end of the year, he continued.

Since the Tongonan project will have the capacity of more than the combined demand of Leyte, it will also eventually supply the power needs of the whole of Samar.

The President said that when the 1,000 megawatt capacity of Tongonan is completed, it is possible to interconnect the Leyte-Samar grid to the Luzon grid utilizing submarine cables.

THE Tongonan project will provide the power supply to industrial projects in the area like the copper smelter and fertilizer plant.

The President took note of the success of the transfer of technology in the geothermal field with the participation of foreign experts, particularly those from New Zealand.

"It should not be hard to imagine a time when in this part of our total energy program we shall achieve a greater degree of self-reliance," the President said.

CSO: 4200/683

INDONESIA'S PROBLEMS AFFECTING LOCAL ECONOMY

Kuala Lumpur BUSINESS TIMES in English 30 May 83 p 19

[Article by Kathryn Davies in Singapore]

[Text]

SINGAPORE-based businessmen, oil refiners and bankers are assessing the implications of neighbouring Indonesia's current economic difficulties, which are having a direct impact on the city state.

Oil refiners have been worst hit, but the tourist-related industries are also suffering. Local manufacturers are wary of investing in Indonesia, despite the devalued rupiah, until the picture becomes clearer.

Domestic demand

A combination of reduced Indonesian demand for oil, the counter-trade or barter system now insisted on by the Indonesian oil company, Pertamina, and the completion of two more large refineries in Indonesia itself is expected to reduce Singapore's role as a refinery. At present it is the world's third largest after Houston and Rotterdam.

A Singapore oil executive who recently visited the new refinery at Cilacap in central Java says that construction is proceeding on schedule and it will begin operations in mid-summer.

Cilacap has a refining capacity of 200,000 barrels a day (b/d), as does an expanded refinery in the Indonesian Borneo town of Balikpapan, which, says the executive, has not been significantly delayed and will also come on stream by the end of the year.

This means that from a total last year of around 210,000 b/d sent to Singaporean refiners, in future Indonesia will only need to send between 70,000 b/d and 80,000 b/d. Singapore's total refinery capacity is 1 million b/d, although it is only operating at 75 per cent capacity, down from 85 per cent a year ago. Shell alone reduced its refining capacity by almost half in February.

Refiners and oil traders have also been forced to accede to Indonesian demands for a counterpurchase policy, selling kerosene and diesel to the Indonesians in return for around 60,000 b/d of Indonesia's low sulphur waxy residue. At the same time, domestic demand for oil product in Indonesia has dropped in response to recent price rises, and Pertamina is buying less in order to deplete its already overburdened stocks.

The industry has drawn little comfort from the recent announcement by the Indonesian government that one major refinery had been "rephased." The plant, costing \$1.5 billion, was to have been built on the Gerong River near Plaju by a Japanese consortium.

The impact of these developments on Singapore's economy overall is serious. The refining industry accounted for 40 per cent of industrial output last year and one-third of the republic's total trade. (Singapore does not publish

trade statistics with Indonesia because of expected discrepancies between Singaporean and Indonesian figures, caused by the volume of smuggling between the two states.)

A further reflection of Indonesia's economic woes has been starkly felt in Singapore's tourist industry, where the recent 27.5 per cent devaluation of the Indonesian rupiah and the imposition of a heavy exit tax have reduced Indonesian arrivals by more than 40 per cent in the past 12 months.

Syndicated lending

Singapore bankers say they are watching the situation in Indonesia with anxiety and there has been a decline in interbank lending to Indonesia. Banks are also less interested in becoming involved in syndicated lending. Bankers note that terms and conditions for lending to Indonesia have toughened in the past 12 months.

Despite the devaluation of the rupiah, there is little move by Singapore companies to invest in Indonesia, although there is still interest in investing in the offshore industrial base of Batam. Potential investors say that although Indonesia may look attractive from their point of view, there is likely to be no major rush into the area until the inflationary impact of recent economic measures can be judged. FT

FAMILY PLANNING IN SECOND MOST DENSELY POPULATED COUNTRY

Kuala Lumpur BUSINESS TIMES in English 15 Jun 83 p 19

[Article by Anne Koh in Singapore]

[Text]

SMALL and resource-scarce Singapore cannot afford to have a big population. Hence the emphasis here has always been to keep the population at an optimum level and efforts towards this have

been successful.

Singapore's family planning campaign, the "girl or boy, two is enough" policy, and other measures under the national family pro-

gramme have been so successful that Singapore's population growth rate at 1.2 per cent is one of the world's lowest.

Its post-war high was 4.7 per cent.

Singapore's population is now 2.4 million but family planning officials say that the target is zero population growth by the year 2030 when the population will stabilise at 3.5 million.

Zero population growth is achieved when birth plus immigration equal death plus emigration.

Crowded

The officials say that this is important and necessary if Singapore wishes to maintain and provide quality of life for its people.

The country's social and economic efforts for adequate housing, medical facilities, job opportunities and the like will be

jeopardised if the population continues to grow excessively.

By having less children, parents will have more time to spend with them. There will be adequate and efficient medical services and demand for housing can be easily met.

Indeed, studies have shown that children from small families are likely to fare better in their school work than those from large families.

Also, as large families make for crowded homes, the conditions are less favourable for study. Large families also tend to be poorer with lower academic qualifications.

The policy of the Singapore Family Planning and Population Board is to continue to discourage early marriages and early parenthood and to space out the birth interval between the first and second child.

The board will also continue to promote the message of a two-child family especially among the low-income group.

It is little wonder that authorities here are stressing so much on family planning and population control programmes. With 3,787 people per square km, Singapore is already the most densely populated country in the world, next to Hong Kong.

Prior to the inception of the board in 1966, there was already in existence in 1949 the Family Planning Association (FFA), a voluntary agency.

Since the board's inception, there had been five-yearly plans to regulate and give impetus to the population programme.

The first five-year plan from 1966 to 1970 was aimed at providing family planning services to 60 per cent of all married women between 15 and 44 years.

It also aimed at reducing the 1964 crude birth rate (CBR) of 32 live-births per thousand population to 20 per thousand by 1970.

The plan succeeded in getting 156,556, or 62 per cent of married women of child-bearing age to accept planning. The CBR also declined to 22.1 per cent.

Sterilisation

The second five-year plan (1971-75) sought to further reduce the CBR to 18 per thousand by 1975. This was to be achieved by recruiting 16,000 more family planning acceptors while retaining the existing ones, motivating couples who have completed their families to undergo sterilisation and creating among adolescents and newly-weds awareness of family planning and its benefits.

At the end of this second five-year plan, the birth rate dropped to 1.3 per cent and there were 89,501 acceptors, exceeding the target figure of 80,000.

In addition, 37,413 women and 1,589 men underwent sterilisation.

Despite the successes, the board realised that it had to go "beyond family planning" and hence, in 1972, the two-child family concept was launched.

Publicity materials on the two-child family norm were distributed and the government introduced incentives to help achieve this goal.

Some of the measures included no "paid maternity" to female civil servants having a third child.

Priority in allocating places in the schools were given to only first and second children of families.

The two-child family campaign succeeded in bringing down the total fertility rate (TFR) from 3.1 children per woman in 1972 to 2.1 in 1975, the years when replacement fertility was reached.

By then, the crude birth rate had been further reduced to 17.8 live-births per thousand population.

During the third plan period (1976-1980), fertility rate dropped further from 2.1 to 1.7 children per woman and crude birth rate to 16.5. — Bernama

SAIYUT ON PLAN TO SET UP LIBYA-AIDED MUSLIM BODY

BK211308 Bangkok THE NATION REVIEW in English 21 Jun 83 pp 1, 3

[Text] Supreme Commander Gen Saiyut Koetphon said yesterday the government's plan to set up a Muslim foundation with financial and political support from Libya will significantly reduce the influence of Muslim terrorist movements in the south.

The foundation will serve as a centre in channelling foreign funds to finance development projects for Muslim community throughout the country.

Gen Saiyut's comments were made during the monthly meeting of the Internal Peace Keeping Command [IPKC] at the Supreme Command. He is currently its director.

The supreme commander told the meeting that the establishment of "The Muslim Foundation of Thailand" resulted from joint efforts by the Supreme Command, Foreign Ministry and the National Psychological Operations Committee which have undertaken moves to forge better relations with countries in the Middle East.

The foundation will abort attempts by southern Muslim terrorists to undermine security in the south and to draw in foreign intervention in the trouble-plagued region, he said.

Some of the terrorist movements are believed to be supported by some Middle East countries, including Libya.

A military delegation has visited Libya to ask for financial support for the foundation as well as to brief Libyan authorities on the Thai Government's policy toward the Muslim people.

The committee of the foundation, which comprises government officials and respected Muslim leaders, will meet early next month to work out details on its activities before formally applying for registration with the Bangkok Metropolitan Administration (BMA), according to Rear Adm Suraphan Wannathat, a senior official of the Supreme Command.

He said some members of the committee will visit Muslim countries to seek financial support for the activities of the foundation.

The foundation will be set up with a 200,000-baht operation fund, he said.

Senior military and police officials attending the IPKC meeting yesterday agreed that the political situation in the country still remained normal and things were still under the control of the country.

Although the Communist Party of Thailand (CPT) is attempting to restructure its organization and adjust its strategy following a series of setbacks, prospects for its revival as a formidable force are still out of sight, the meeting concluded.

CSO: 4200/689

VOFA MOURNS ENDING OF ANTIPIRACY PROGRAM

BK241008 Bangkok Voice of Free Asia in English 1230 GMT 23 Jun 83

[Unattributed commentary: "On the Antipiracy Program"]

[Text] June 22d, the 1982-83 antipiracy program in the Gulf of Thailand expired yesterday, meaning the arrangement would unfortunately come to an end unless a new fund will be available. The termination of the program would definitely result in the increase in pirate attacks against boat people in the Gulf. Interesting enough, the antipiracy program has expired without publicity, contrasting with last year when the arrangement newly began. Thailand was then roundly and unfairly charged with inactivity in combating piracy in the Gulf. Some Western critics went even as far as accusing the Thai authorities of having been engineering the piracy itself as an effective deterrent to the unwanted influx of Vietnamese refugees. However, the records show otherwise.

For instance, a spokesman of UNHCR was quoted in Geneva early this month that the antipiracy program had helped cut pirate attacks against the refuge seekers in the Gulf of Thailand by between 30 to 50 percent since last August. To many the shown figures might not be that impressive, but with three patrol boats and two aging spotter planes to cover more than 18,000 square km of waters, where piracy against Vietnamese refugees and Thai fishing trawlers is often reported, the antipiracy force's performance has been but remarkable. Yet the Thai authorities agree that further efforts are required to boost the antipiracy capability.

Early this month, a meeting between UNHCR and representatives of 12 donor countries was held to discuss a continuation of the program, but only \$2.64 million was requested by the UNHCR director of international protection mainly to cover the operation cost for another 12 month period, as well as to purchase an additional surveillance plane for the antipiracy force. The \$2.64 million found, of course, fell far too short to meet the Thai request. It is also \$1.03 million smaller than last year's contribution. So, given such limited contribution to finance the continuation of the antipiracy program, if any, it would not be surprised at all if the instance of attacks against asylum seekers will be again on the increase in months ahead. Thus, Western critics would this time rather use their sharpened pens fairly, because evidences show that Thailand has done its best to combat the hideous crime of piracy, which according to the Geneva Convention of 1958 is a problem of common concern to all nations, not just Thailand alone in this region.

CSO: 4200/689

OFFICIAL ON NATURAL GAS, OIL PRODUCTION

BK201354 Bangkok Domestic Service in Thai 1300 GMT 19 Jun 83

[Text] Deputy Industry Minister Chirayu Itsarangkun Na Ayutthaya reported that the government had asked the Union Oil Company to increase natural gas production from the Gulf of Thailand. Natural gas production at the Ergas field, which has been raised from the previous level of only about 110 million cubic feet per day to between 150 and 160 million cubic feet, is still below the production target of between 200 and 250 million cubic feet per day.

The government has also concluded a second contract with the Union Oil Company for natural gas production from the newly developed gas field in 1985. In this connection, the government had asked the Union Oil Company to start production from the new field under the second contract immediately. Production of between 30 and 35 million cubic feet per day is targeted from the Banphot field within this year. This is aimed at assuring sufficient supplies of natural gas for local consumption. It is thus believed that the natural gas supply problem will be solved in the near future. Natural gas production from the new gas field under the contract signed for 1985 is targeted for 150 million cubic feet per day during the first stage 300 million cubic feet per day the following year, and 400 million cubic feet per day the year after that.

Concerning crude oil production from the Sirikit well in Lankrabu District, the deputy industry minister said that production, at over 4,000 barrels per day, is close to the target which was set at 5,000 barrels per day in the initial stage. The low level in production is due to the small number of wells drilled. Yet, the production came relatively early following the discovery of the oil well, that is, only 1 year after drilling and discovery and this is much different than what happened in other countries. The government has set up a committee in charge of supervising and negotiating with the concessionary company over crude oil production from the Sirikit well so that it will best serve the interests of the country, he said.

CSO: 4207/137

BRIEFS

FISHERY COOPERATIVE MEETS SRV OFFICIALS--The Samut Sakhon Fishery Cooperative has held talks with Vietnamese officials on the joint fishing venture between Thailand and Vietnam, it was learned at this weekend. The cooperative's chairman reportedly said that he had proposed that the joint venture be initiated by the governments of both countries. He also revealed that he was told during a meeting with Vietnamese Embassy officials in Bangkok last week that Vietnam intends to release 8 Thai trawlers and 17 crewmen early next month. He said the officials told him that the eight trawlers must each pay 23,000 baht in fines to Vietnam for trespassing into its territorial waters. [Text] [BK220906 Bangkok Voice of Free Asia in English 1230 GMT 21 Jun 83]

PHICHAI RECEIVES NEW SWEDISH AMBASSADOR--Swedish Ambassador to Thailand (Nils-Olov Frederic Hasslev) paid a courtesy call on Deputy Prime Minister Phichai Rattakum at 1430 on 20 June at Government House. The new Swedish ambassador exchanged views with the deputy prime minister on several international issues, including the Kampuchea problem. He expressed support for Thailand's stand calling for a free election in Kampuchea and the withdrawal of Vietnamese troops from Kampuchea. Thailand, meanwhile, hoped for backing from Sweden at the International Conference on Kampuchea. The Thai deputy prime minister cordially thanked the Swedish ambassador for his government's concern over Thailand's border situation. [Text] [BK220924 Bangkok Voice of Free Asia in Thai 1000 GMT 21 Jun 83]

CSO: 4207/137

MILITARY AFFAIRS AND PUBLIC SECURITY

COUNCIL OF MINISTERS' DECREE ON SPECULATION, CONTRABAND

Hanoi NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 14 May 83 pp 1, 4

[Article: "The Prosecution of Acts of Speculation and Smuggling, the Manufacture of Fake Products and the Operation of Illegal Businesses"]

[Text] On 10 May 1983, the Council of Ministers promulgated a decree on the administrative prosecution of acts of speculation and smuggling, the manufacture of fake goods and the operation of illegal businesses. Below is the complete text of decree number 46-HDBT:

Chapter I--General Regulations

Article 1: every act of speculation, smuggling, the manufacture of fake goods and the operation of illegal businesses, from a minor infraction to a violation so serious as to require investigation of criminal culpability, is to be prosecuted by administrative measures in accordance with the provisions of this decree.

A minor infraction is a case in which the value of the contraband is less than twenty thousand dong (20,000 dong); the nature of the violation is not serious; the harm caused by it to the production and life of the people and to the order and safety of society is not serious; the violator has no criminal record or history of prior arrests; and, when apprehended, the violator was not resisting cadres and personnel in the performance of their duty.

Article 2: the authority for determining that a violation is a minor infraction in order to prosecute it by administrative measures lies with the agencies of the state that have been given the authority to administratively prosecute these types of violations. Concerning cases and incidents in which it is difficult to determine whether they are minor infractions or crimes, the administrative prosecution agency must exchange opinions with the People's Organ of Control on the same level. If the People's Organ of Control feels that it is necessary to investigate the possibility of criminal culpability, the administrative prosecution agency must forward the files in question to it.

The procedures involved in administrative prosecution are carried out in accordance with the current regulations that apply to each related field (such as market management, taxes, customs, forest security, economic police and the other fields).

Article 3: the action taken against violations must be prompt and fair. The size of the fine must be based on the scale of the violation and the harm caused by it; the scheme employed by the violator; the character of the violator; and whether the violation was a first-time offense or a repeat offense.

If a complaint is filed concerning the administrative action decided upon, the authorized agency must examine and act upon it within the amount of time stipulated under the law.

Chapter II—the Administrative Prosecution Measures

Article 4: any person who speculates in materials, commodities or the various types of ration coupons, tickets and papers used in the distribution of goods or the supply of services and the value of the contraband in question is less than twenty thousand dong (20,000 dong), will, depending upon the gravity of the offense, be punished as follows:

1. A fine equal to three to five times the value of the contraband.
2. All contraband will be purchased on a confiscatory basis at the directed price of the state for similar products, if the violation is a first-time offense, if the contraband is not among those products in which private parties are prohibited from doing business by the state and if the value of the contraband is less than 10,000 dong.

3. All contraband will be purchased on a confiscatory basis if the offense falls within one of the following categories:

--A repeat offense;

--The value of the contraband is ten thousand dong (10,000 dong) or more;

--The contraband is among the products in which private parties are prohibited from doing business by the state;

--The contraband is ration stamps, tickets or papers of value in the distribution of goods or the supply of services.

Article 5: any person who smuggles or illegally stores gold, silver, precious metals, precious gems, foreign currency, technical materials or other goods, the trading or hoarding of which are prohibited by the state and the value of which is less than twenty thousand dong (20,000 dong); any person who illegally sells or transports goods across the border by highway, water route or air, the value of which is less than twenty thousand dong (20,000), will be fined as follows:

1. All contraband and the means used to store and transport this contraband will be purchased on a confiscatory basis;
2. A fine equal to one to two times the value of the contraband, if the violation is a first-time offense.
3. A fine of three to five times the value of the contraband if the violation is a repeat offense.

Article 6: any person who has just begun to make or sell a small quantity of fake goods will be penalized as follows:

1. All contraband and the equipment used to make it will be purchased on a confiscatory basis.
2. A fine of 500 to 10,000 dong.

If the violation is a repeat offense or if the fake products are fake grain, fake food products or fake medicine, criminal culpability must be investigated in all cases.

Article 7: anyone who operates a business without a license or in a manner that does not conform with the license that has been issued and anyone who violates the regulations on the posting of prices or product label registration regulations but not to a degree that requires the investigation of criminal culpability will be penalized as follows:

1. Issued a warning within the trade sector, village or subward.
2. Fined 100 to 500 dong if the violation is a first-time offense.

Fined from 500 to 10,000 dong if the violation is a repeat offense.

Persons who charge prices that are higher than posted prices, in addition to being fined as described above, will also be prosecuted in accordance with Article 8 of Council of Ministers' decree number 19-HDBT dated 23 March 1983, which defines in detail how the Law Revising Articles of the Industrial and Commercial Tax Code is to be enforced.

Article 8: the administrative prosecution of persons who violate the tax code is to be carried out in accordance with the provisions of the Law Revising Articles of the Industrial and Commercial Tax Code dated 26 February 1983.

Article 9: persons who have been issued a business license who commit any of the above mentioned violations set forth in this decree will, in addition to being fined pursuant to Articles 4, 5, 6 and 7 of this decree, will also have their business license suspended for a specific amount of time or indefinitely.

Article 10: violators who are cadres, manual workers or civil servants of the state or social organizations or are cadres or soldiers of the armed forces, in addition to being fined pursuant to Articles 4, 5, 6 and 7 of this decree, will also be subjected to administrative disciplinary action.

Article 11: the value of the contraband mentioned above is to be computed on the basis of average prices on the unorganized market at the time that the violation is being prosecuted. These prices are to be verified by the local price management agency.

The prices of contraband that is seized through confiscatory purchases are the state confiscatory purchase prices for these products.

Chapter III--Handling of Material Evidence and the Revenues from Fines

Article 12: material evidence that is being temporarily held while awaiting prosecution must be listed in the report and held under tight security.

The head of the control unit at which material evidence is being stored is responsible for all losses of evidence, all damage to evidence and any use of evidence for the purpose of barter.

Article 13: material evidence being held must be handled and disposed of as follows:

1. If the material evidence that has been seized is a perishable consumer good, it must be immediately turned over to the state-operated commerce organization on the same level to be sold; other types are to be turned over to the agency whose function it is to manage that type of product for temporary storage while awaiting prosecution.

The agency that receives these goods must be given a detailed receipt, must follow all the procedures for depositing these goods in a storehouse and must record them on the list of property being temporarily held while awaiting prosecution.

Once a decision concerning prosecution has been reached by the authorized agency, the sale or distribution of the temporarily held goods mentioned above must be carried out in exact accordance with state regulations. If they are goods that were confiscated, the agency that confiscated them must turn over the revenues from their sale to the finance agency for inclusion in the budget, after deducting the reward determined by the prosecuting agency; if the goods were seized through a confiscatory purchase, payment must be made to the violator. If neither of these cases applies, the goods must be immediately returned to their owner.

2. As regards fake goods, the head of the agency that is authorized to prosecute the violation is to arrange for their destruction and file a report once they have been destroyed.

3. If the violation requires the investigation of possible criminal culpability, when the files are sent to the People's Organ of Control, they must be accompanied by a list of the material evidence that was seized; this evidence must be processed in accordance with the decision by the People's Organ of Control.

Article 14: fines that violators must pay are paid to the prosecuting agency; after deducting the reward for the person who recorded the achievement, this agency is to turn over the balance of the fine for inclusion in the state budget.

Chapter IV--the Rewards for Persons Who Record Achievements by Reporting and Apprehending Violators

Article 15: persons who record achievements by reporting or apprehending violators, in addition to being rewarded in accordance with the general regulations of the state, will also receive a reward equal to 5 to 10 percent of the value of the goods confiscated or the amount of the fine paid, depending upon the actual contribution made by each person.

The amount of the reward given to the persons mentioned above is to be determined by the head of the prosecuting agency.

As regards cadres and personnel of units whose function it is to perform control work, the above mentioned rewards are paid to the unit; the head of the unit will, on the basis of the contribution made by each person, determine the specific reward to be given to each person.

A person who is to receive a reward may only receive it after the decision concerning prosecution has been made.

The use of confiscated goods or goods seized through confiscatory purchases as a reward is prohibited.

Chapter V--Articles of Enforcement

Article 16: the ministers, the heads of the state commissions, the heads of the other agencies of the Council of Ministers that have the function of guiding and managing the market and the people's committees of the provinces and the municipalities and special zone subordinate to the central level are responsible for guiding and inspecting the enforcement of this decree; responsible for promptly praising and rewarding cadres and personnel who record achievements and, at the same time, responsible for taking stern action against persons who do not fulfill their responsibility or who violate the provisions of this decree, thereby harming the interests of the state and the people.

Article 17: the Minister of Finance shall provide detailed instructions concerning the handling and disposal of seized material evidence and the payment of rewards as set forth in this decree.

Article 18: this decree is effective on the date of its promulgation.

All previous regulations that contradict this decree are hereby cancelled.

AGRICULTURE

EDITORIAL ON INCREASED SUBSIDIARY FOOD CROP OUTPUT

Hanoi NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 14 May 83 p 1

[Editorial: "Endeavoring To Increase the Output of Subsidiary Food Crops"]

[Text] Subsidiary food crop output has been declining since 1980. Subsidiary food crops, in paddy equivalent, have declined from 18.7 percent of total grain output in 1980 to 17.2 percent in 1981 and 14.7 percent in 1982. This year, subsidiary food crop output might decline even more.

The causes of the decline in subsidiary food crop output are many, but the main cause is the lack of appropriate attention to these crops in our leadership and guidance; the structure of subsidiary food crop production is inappropriate; there has been a lack of investment in and a lack of specific measures for intensively cultivating and processing subsidiary food crops; only small quantities of subsidiary food crops are being purchased and some localities have limited the circulation of these crops; on land that is used to raise both rice and subsidiary food crops, importance is only attached to rice, etc.

Of our cropland, some land is better suited to the cultivation of subsidiary food crops, which are a dry-land grain crop, than to the cultivation of wet rice. Subsidiary food crops are an indispensable product in the structure of grain production. Subsidiary food crops account for an important percentage, from 12 to 45 percent, of total grain output in the various areas of the country. They are an essential need of humans and an essential need in livestock production and a number of industrial sectors. Raising total subsidiary food crop output is an important guideline in implementing the grain production plan.

In order to raise the output of subsidiary food crops now and over the next few years, attention must be given to both multicropping and intensive cultivation.

The potentials for multicropping are very large. In the Red River Delta and northern former Zone 4, multicropping can be practiced by expanding the amount of area under the cultivation of winter crops, raising a summer-fall crop on land transplanted with two rice crops and replacing the winter-spring crop of long-term subsidiary food crops with two short term subsidiary food crops, a winter crop and a spring crop. From southern former Zone 4 to the coastal provinces of central Vietnam, multicropping can be practiced by raising

summer-fall subsidiary food crops on established terraces and high fields used to raise two rice crops. In the provinces of Mekong River Delta, spring-summer subsidiary food crops can be raised on two crop rice fields or fields used to raise one long-term 10th month rice crop. In the Central Highlands and eastern Nam Bo, two short-term subsidiary food crops can be raised during the rainy season. In the mountains and the foothills of the midlands, the multicropping of subsidiary food crops can be practiced on land that lies fallow during the winter and spring.

Tremendous potential for increasing total output lies in intensive cultivation. Generally speaking, the yields of subsidiary food crops are still low. Western potato yields only average about 8 tons per hectare, corn yields only average 0.9 to 1 ton per hectare, sweet potatoes only 4 to 6 tons, cassava only 7 to 8 tons and so forth. Meanwhile, in the areas that practice intensive cultivation, yields can be two to three times as high as average yields. By merely supplying some more chemical fertilizers suited to each type crop and using the organic fertilizer provided by families, we can achieve superior yields. For example, we usually plant from 370,000 to 380,000 hectares of corn each year and harvest from 370,000 to 400,000 tons; if we were to invest 300 kilograms of standard nitrogen per hectare in approximately 250,000 to 300,000 hectares, we could achieve an output of 600,000 to 750,000 tons. Increasing the production of subsidiary food crops by practicing intensive cultivation will meet the need for grain and free land for the production of crops of higher export value.

The localities must, on the basis of their arable land, the needs for subsidiary food crops for humans, livestock and the processing industry and the need for crops to process into commodities, recalculate the allocation of subsidiary food crops and establish specialized farming areas and areas in which multicropping is practiced in order to adopt a policy on building material-technical bases, such as irrigation, seed, fertilizer, processing plants and purchasing and storage facilities. With regard to multicropping, attention must be given to establishing the allocation of crops and implementing the contract system for the various types of crops raised during the year. Incentive must be provided for the production of some crops, consequently, full investments must be made in these crops so that farmers can boldly expand subsidiary food crop production.

In those areas that can develop the production of subsidiary food crops but lack transportation capabilities, efforts should be shifted to the cultivation of subsidiary food crops of high value or to producing products of greater value, such as refining subsidiary food crops locally or raising subsidiary food crops in conjunction with livestock in order to convert subsidiary food crops into meat. Making the shift from self-sufficiency in subsidiary food crop production to the production of subsidiary food crop products requires well-coordinated changes in production, processing, distribution and circulation. As a result, the responsibility for acceleration production and increasing subsidiary food crop output lies with both the localities and the central sectors, primarily with the agricultural, food industry and distribution, circulation sectors.

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AGRICULTURE

CHAIRMAN OF COUNCIL OF MINISTERS ISSUES DIRECTIVE ON MARINE PRODUCT SECTOR

Hanoi NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 14 May 83 pp 1, 4

[VNA News Release: "Accelerating the Development of the Marine Products Sector"]

[Text] On 4 May, the chairman of the Council of Ministers issued directive 124/CT on accelerating the development of the marine products sector. The directive reads as follows:

The fishing industry of the entire country has begun the implementation of the third 5-year plan (1981-1985) by taking strides forward. During the 2 years 1981 and 1982, the marine products sector exceeded the quotas of the state plan; during the same 2 years, the export-import business reached the highest level of development ever. A number of improved management policies stimulated the development of the fishing industry and gradually but effectively corrected the management mechanism characterized by administrative procedures and subsidization. The organizational apparatus of the sector has been streamlined somewhat, the guidance of production has improved and attention has been given to the application of scientific-technological advances in production.

However, material-technical bases are still underdeveloped; the transformation of the old production relations and the establishment of the new, socialist production relations are proceeding slowly; appropriate attention has not been given to planning or to the division of labor and echelons within the fishing industry; the procurement and service networks are still weak; and competition in the purchasing and the sale of marine products for exportation, especially some special products, such as shrimp, squid and so forth, within some localities and sectors has caused the price of these products to suddenly rise on the market.

In order to accelerate the development of the fishing industry and the exportation of marine products during the years from 1983 to 1985, with a view toward meeting and exceeding the norms of the 5-year plan, beginning with those of the 1983 plan, the chairman of the Council of Ministers hereby issues the following directive:

1. The Ministry of Maritime Products must coordinate with the concerned localities and sectors in order to formulate and complete the overall planning of the development of the fishing industry throughout the country at an early date. It must establish correct relationships between fishing and cultivation, between domestic consumption and exportation. Together with intensifying the harvesting and exportation of marine products, importance must be attached to pisciculture and to making full use of all bodies of water in the lowlands, the mountains and tidewater areas to raise such valuable marine products as shrimp, water caltrops and so forth, for exportation.

2. The transformation of production relations must be intensified. Directive 330-/TTC on the transformation and development of the ocean fishing industry must continue to be implemented well. The state-operated and collective sectors must play the dominant role within the fishing industry, especially the state-operated sector. In the immediate future, the Ministry of Maritime Products and the concerned localities and sectors must successfully implement directive 120/HDBT dated 17 July 1982 on reorganizing the production and construction installations and strengthening the state-operated units that harvest and cultivate marine products; decree 51/HDBT on promulgating the marine product cooperative statutes; decision 16/CP on the payment of contract wages, piecework wages and bonuses within state-operated and collective units that harvest and cultivate marine products; and decision 97/HDBT on the policy on the development of marine products cultivation. At the same time, more attention must be given to the cultural lives of the people of the coastal areas.

3. Full importance must be attached to the application of scientific-technological advances in the harvesting, cultivation and processing of products and the improvement of product quality. The marine product research institutes, colleges and middle schools must coordinate teaching and learning with scientific-technical research, experimentation and the support of production well. Scientific and technical forces must be mobilized to resolve the pressing problems being encountered in production on the basis of specific economic contracts between scientific agencies and production installations.

The Ministry of Maritime Products and the Ministry of Higher and Vocational Middle Schools, together with the various localities, must adopt plans for quickly training a corps of local scientific-technical cadres and economic management cadres for the sector; appropriate priority must be given to selecting children of fishermen for training as cadres.

4. Through its organizations and together with the people's committees of the various localities, the marine products sector must manage and organize all aspects of production, supply operations, purchasing activities, the control of the sources of goods, processing, transportation, the support of local consumer needs and the delivery of goods to the central level and for exportation.

The Ministry of Maritime Products and the localities must make good use of the various forms of joint business and associations among the localities and between the localities and the central level.

5. An effort must be made to exceed the norm of the 5-year plan concerning the total value of exported marine products. The Ministry of Maritime Products is responsible for managing the marine products export-import plan throughout the country in exact accordance with Council of Ministers' decision 113/HDBT dated 7 October 1982 concerning the policy and measures for developing exports and improving the management of exports and imports.

Through its marine products export corporations, the Ministry of Maritime Products must organize the export-import business well and support the various localities. The right to use foreign currency from the exportation of marine products by the locality is determined on the basis of the policy that has been promulgated to provide incentive for exports; specifically:

--Products that are produced under the plan and directly managed by the central level: 70 percent of net income in foreign currency;

--Products produced under the plan that are not managed by the central level: 90 percent of the net income in foreign currency;

--Exports over and above the plan: 90 percent of the net income in foreign currency.

As regards the directly subordinate production units, such as the state-operated exported shrimp and fish enterprises (the Marine Products Federated Enterprise, the Chien Thang State-Operated Fishing Enterprise and so forth), the ministry will decide how foreign currency is to be used to import materials and equipment for the development of production.

There must be strict compliance with the regulations of the state governing market management and prices. The present competition in the purchasing of export goods must be eliminated. State-operated organizations are strictly forbidden to raise purchasing prices as they see fit.

In order to develop production and strengthen the material-technical bases of the sector, the Ministry of Maritime Products, as a form of business corporation, is permitted to make foreign currency loans.

6. The Ministry of National Defense and the Ministry of Interior, along with the Ministry of Maritime Products and the people's committees of the provinces and municipalities, must adopt plans for and must tightly organize and manage the coastal region... With regard to the southwest fishing grounds and the Thuan Hai fishing grounds, which are the largest in the country and are grounds in which all state-operated and collective forces are permitted to fish, the Ministry of Maritime Products must adopt a unified plan for the fishing forces of the entire country, establish a division of labor among them and promulgate regulations on when to move to another fishing grounds in order to protect resources. It must research, propose, promulgate or revise a number of policies governing expenditures on and rewards for the forces that maintain order and security at sea.

Together with the people's committees of the provinces and the municipalities and special zone directly subordinate to the central level and the other

related ministries and agencies, the Ministry of Maritime Products must adopt a plan for resolving the problems being faced now and further strengthen the ties between the sector and the local level in order to create the conditions for strongly developing marine products production and effectively developing our tremendous potentials in the years ahead.

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BIOGRAPHIC

INFORMATION ON VIETNAMESE PERSONALITIES

[The following information on Vietnamese personalities has been extracted from Vietnamese-language sources published in Hanoi, unless otherwise indicated. Asterisked job title indicates that this is the first known press reference to this individual functioning in this capacity.]

CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE 2ND VIETNAM FATHERLAND FRONT

(Elected on 14 May 1983)

Honorary President

Hoàng Quốc Việt [HOANGF QUOOCS VIEETJ]

Honorary Chairman of the 2nd Vietnam Fatherland Front; on 14 May 1983 he was elected to this position. (QUAN DOI NHAN DAN 15 May 83 p 1)

Chairman

Huỳnh Tấn Phát [HUYNHF TAANS PHATS]

Chairman of the Presidium of the 2nd Vietnam Fatherland Front; he was elected to this position on 14 May 1983. (QUAN DOI NHAN DAN 15 May 83 p 1)

Members of the Presidium

I Bì A-lê-ô [I BI A-LEE-OO]

Member of the Presidium of the 2nd Vietnam Fatherland Front; he was elected to this position on 14 May 1983. (QUAN DOI NHAN DAN 15 May 83 p 1)

Phan Anh [PHAN ANH]

Member of the Presidium of the 2nd Vietnam Fatherland Front; he was elected to this position on 14 May 1983. (QUAN DOI NHAN DAN 15 May 83 p 1)

Cù Huy Cận [CUF HUY CAANJ]

Member of the Presidium of the 2nd Vietnam Fatherland Front; he was elected to this position on 14 May 1983. (QUAN DOI NHAN DAN 15 May 83 p 1)

Nguyễn Đình Chi [NGUYEENX DINHF CHI]

Member of the Presidium of the 2nd Vietnam Fatherland Front; she was elected to this position on 14 May 1983. (QUAN DOI NHAN DAN 15 May 83 p 1)

Võ Chí Công [VOX CHIS COONG]

Member of the Presidium of the 2nd Vietnam Fatherland Front; he was elected to this position on 14 May 1983. (QUAN DOI NHAN DAN 15 May 83 p 1)

Phùng Văn Cung [PHUNGF VAWN CUNG]

Member of the Presidium of the 2nd Vietnam Fatherland Front; he was elected to this position on 14 May 1983. (QUAN DOI NHAN DAN 15 May 83 p 1)

Lê Quang Đạo [LEE QUANG DAOJ]

Member of the Presidium of the 2nd Vietnam Fatherland Front; he was elected to this position on 14 May 1983. (QUAN DOI NHAN DAN 15 May 83 p 1)

Nguyễn Thị Định [NGUYEENX THIJ DINHJ]

Member of the Presidium of the 2nd Vietnam Fatherland Front; she was elected to this position on 14 May 1983. (QUAN DOI NHAN DAN 15 May 83 p 1)

Huỳnh Trung Đống [HUYNHF TRUNG DOONGF]

Member of the Presidium of the 2nd Vietnam Fatherland Front; he was elected to this position on 14 May 1983. (QUAN DOI NHAN DAN 15 May 83 p 1)

Hoàng Minh Giám [HOANGF MINH GIAMS]

Member of the Presidium of the 2nd Vietnam Fatherland Front; he was elected to this position on 14 May 1983. (QUAN DOI NHAN DAN 15 May 83 p 1)

Nguyễn Văn Hiếu [NGUYEENX VAWN HIEEUS]

Member of the Presidium of the 2nd Vietnam Fatherland Front; he was elected to this position on 14 May 1983. (QUAN DOI NHAN DAN 15 May 83 p 1)

Nguyễn Hộ [NGUYEENX HOOJ]

Member of the Presidium of the 2nd Vietnam Fatherland Front; he was elected to this position on 14 May 1983. (QUAN DOI NHAN DAN 15 May 83 p 1)

Nguyễn Nam Khánh [NGUYEENX NAM KHANHS], Major General

Member of the Presidium of the 2nd Vietnam Fatherland Front; he was elected to this position on 14 May 1983. (QUAN DOI NHAN DAN 15 May 83 p 1)

Trần [^]Băng Khoa [TRAANF DAWNG KHOA]

Member of the Presidium of the 2nd Vietnam Fatherland Front; he was elected to this position on 14 May 1983. (QUAN DOI NHAN DAN 15 May 83 p 1)

Trần ²Buu [^]Kiem [TRAANF BUWUR KIEEMS]

Member of the Presidium of the 2nd Vietnam Fatherland Front; he was elected to this position on 14 May 1983. (QUAN DOI NHAN DAN 15 May 83 p 1)

Nguyễn Văn [^]Kiệt [NGUYEENX VAWN KIEETJ]

Member of the Presidium of the 2nd Vietnam Fatherland Front; he was elected to this position on 14 May 1983. (QUAN DOI NHAN DAN 15 May 83 p 1)

Nguyễn [^]Long [NGUYEENX LONG]

Member of the Presidium of the 2nd Vietnam Fatherland Front; he was elected to this position on 14 May 1983. (QUAN DOI NHAN DAN 15 May 83 p 1)

Vũ [~]Mao [VUX MAOX]

Member of the Presidium of the 2nd Vietnam Fatherland Front; he was elected to this position on 14 May 1983. (QUAN DOI NHAN DAN 15 May 83 p 1)

Hoàng [^]Trường Minh [HOANGF TRUWOWNGF MINH]

Member of the Presidium of the 2nd Vietnam Fatherland Front; he was elected to this position on 14 May 1983. (QUAN DOI NHAN DAN 15 May 83 p 1)

Trần [^]Đại Nghĩa [TRAANF DAIJ NGHIA]

Member of the Presidium of the 2nd Vietnam Fatherland Front; he was elected to this position on 14 May 1983. (QUAN DOI NHAN DAN 15 May 83 p 1)

Thích Minh [^]Nguyệt [THICHS MINH NGUYEETJ], Buddhist Priest

Member of the Presidium of the 2nd Vietnam Fatherland Front; he was elected to this position on 14 May 1983. (QUAN DOI NHAN DAN 15 May 83 p 1)

Núp [NUPS]

Member of the Presidium of the 2nd Vietnam Fatherland Front; he was elected to this position on 14 May 1983. (QUAN DOI NHAN DAN 15 May 83 p 1)

Phan [^]Khắc ²Quang [PHAN KHAWCS QUANG]

Member of the Presidium of the 2nd Vietnam Fatherland Front; he was elected to this position on 14 May 1983. (QUAN DOI NHAN DAN 15 May 83 p 1)

Phạm Biểu Tâm² [PHAMJ BIEEUR TAAM]

Member of the Presidium of the 2nd Vietnam Fatherland Front; he was elected to this position on 14 May 1983. (QUAN DOI NHAN DAN 15 May 83 p 1)

Trình Đình Thảo² [TRINHJ DINHF THAOR]

Member of the Presidium of the 2nd Vietnam Fatherland Front; he was elected to this position on 14 May 1983. (QUAN DOI NHAN DAN 15 May 83 p 1)

Nguyễn Hữu Thọ² [NGUYEENX HUWUX THOJ]

Member of the Presidium of the 2nd Vietnam Fatherland Front; he was elected to this position on 14 May 1983. (QUAN DOI NHAN DAN 15 May 83 p 1)

Nguyễn Thị Thập² [NGUYEENX THIJ THAAPJ]

Member of the Presidium of the 2nd Vietnam Fatherland Front; she was elected to this position on 14 May 1983. (QUAN DOI NHAN DAN 15 May 83 p 1)

Hoàng Thế Thiện² [HOANGF THEES THIEENJ]

Member of the Presidium of the 2nd Vietnam Fatherland Front; he was elected to this position on 14 May 1983. (QUAN DOI NHAN DAN 15 May 83 p 1)

Tô Thiện² [TOO THIEENJ]

Member of the Presidium of the 2nd Vietnam Fatherland Front; he was elected to this position on 14 May 1983. (QUAN DOI NHAN DAN 15 May 83 p 1)

Sơn Thông² [SOWN THOONG]

Member of the Presidium of the 2nd Vietnam Fatherland Front; he was elected to this position on 14 May 1983. (QUAN DOI NHAN DAN 15 May 83 p 1)

Nguyễn Thành Thơ² [NGUYEENX THANH F THOW]

Member of the Presidium of the 2nd Vietnam Fatherland Front; he was elected to this position on 14 May 1983. (QUAN DOI NHAN DAN 15 May 83 p 1)

Lê Văn Thới² [LEE VAWN THOWIS]

Member of the Presidium of the 2nd Vietnam Fatherland Front; he was elected to this position on 14 May 1983. (QUAN DOI NHAN DAN 15 May 83 p 1)

Nguyễn Văn Thu² [NGUYEENX VAWN THUR]

Member of the Presidium of the 2nd Vietnam Fatherland Front; he was elected to this position on 14 May 1983. (QUAN DOI NHAN DAN 15 May 83 p 1)

Thích Trí Thu² [THICHS TRIS THUR], Buddhist Priest

Member of the Presidium of the 2nd Vietnam Fatherland Front; he was elected to this position on 14 May 1983. (QUAN DOI NHAN DAN 15 May 83 p 1)

Nguyễn Đức Thuận [NGUYEENX DUWCS THUAANJ]

Member of the Presidium of the 2nd Vietnam Fatherland Front; he was elected to this position on 14 May 1983. (QUAN DOI NHAN DAN 15 May 83 p 1)

Xuân Thủy² [XUAAN THUYR]

Member of the Presidium of the 2nd Vietnam Fatherland Front; he was elected to this position on 14 May 1983. (QUAN DOI NHAN DAN 15 May 83 p 1)

Nguyễn Văn Tiến [NGUYEENX VAWN TIEENS]

Member of the Presidium of the 2nd Vietnam Fatherland Front; he was elected to this position on 14 May 1983. (QUAN DOI NHAN DAN 15 May 83 p 1)

Nguyễn Ngọc Trần [NGUYEENX NGOCJ TRAAN]

Member of the Presidium of the 2nd Vietnam Fatherland Front; he was elected to this position on 14 May 1983. (QUAN DOI NHAN DAN 15 May 83 p 1)

Trần Nam Trung [TRAANF NAM TRUNG]

Member of the Presidium of the 2nd Vietnam Fatherland Front; he was elected to this position on 14 May 1983. (QUAN DOI NHAN DAN 15 May 83 p 1)

Lê Quang Vinh [LEE QUANG VINHJ]

Member of the Presidium of the 2nd Vietnam Fatherland Front; he was elected to this position on 14 May 1983. (QUAN DOI NHAN DAN 15 May 83 p 1)

Nguyễn Thế Vinh [NGUYEENX THEES VINHJ]

Member of the Presidium of the 2nd Vietnam Fatherland Front; he was elected to this position on 14 May 1983. (QUAN DOI NHAN DAN 15 May 83 p 1)

Nguyễn Xiên² [NGUYEENX XIEENR]

Member of the Presidium of the 2nd Vietnam Fatherland Front; he was elected to this position on 14 May 1983. (QUAN DOI NHAN DAN 15 May 83 p 1)

Nghiêm Xuân Yêm [NGHIEEM XUAAN YEEM]

Member of the Presidium of the 2nd Vietnam Fatherland Front; he was elected to this position on 14 May 1983. (QUAN DOI NHAN DAN 15 May 83 p 1)

Secretariat

Nguyễn Văn Tiến [NGUYEENX VAWN TIEENS]

Secretary General of the 2nd Vietnam Fatherland Front; he was elected to this position on 14 May 1983. (QUAN DOI NHAN DAN 15 May 83 p 1)

Nguyễn Minh [NGUYFENX MINH]

Deputy Secretary General of the 2nd Vietnam Fatherland Front; he was elected to this position on 14 May 1983. (QUAN DOI NHAN DAN 15 May 83 p 1)

Nguyễn Thị Ngọc Dung [NGUYEENX THIJ NGOCJ ZUNG]

Deputy Secretary General of the 2nd Vietnam Fatherland Front; on 14 May 1983 she was elected to this position. (QUAN DOI NHAN DAN 15 May 83 p 1)

Lê Quang Vinh [LEE QUANG VINHJ]

Deputy Secretary General of the 2nd Vietnam Fatherland Front; on 14 May 1983 he was elected to this position. (QUAN DOI NHAN DAN 15 May 83 p 1)

Nguyễn Tấn Gi Trọng [NGUYEENX TAANS GI TRONGJ]

Member of the Secretariat of the 2nd Vietnam Fatherland Front; on 14 May 1983 he was elected to this position. (QUAN DOI NHAN DAN 15 May 83 p 1)

Phạm Gia Kính [PHAMJ GIA KINHS]

Member of the Secretariat of the 2nd Vietnam Fatherland Front; on 14 May 1983 he was elected to this position. (QUAN DOI NHAN DAN 15 May 83 p 1)

Mai Khang [MAI KHANG]

Member of the Secretariat of the 2nd Vietnam Fatherland Front; on 14 May 1983 he was elected to this position. (QUAN DOI NHAN DAN 15 May 83 p 1)

Hoàng Thái [HOANGF THAIS]

Member of the Secretariat of the 2nd Vietnam Fatherland Front; on 14 May 1983 he was elected to this position. (QUAN DOI NHAN DAN 15 May 83 p 1)

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